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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the effects of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests conducted at the Nevada 
Test Site from 1951-1962 on Washington County, Utah, specifically focusing on the effects of 
these detonations on the local population, the local flora and fauna, and the ensuing impact of 
political and economic forces.  While some Americans readily concede that these tests were 
necessary for the survival of the United States in the face of Soviet nuclear aggression, other 
Americans (notably, those who were most closely affected) do not share such a patriotic view of 
the government’s conduct in performing such extensive and damaging experiments.  Therefore, 
the historical philosophy behind the compulsion to treat the deserts of the American Southwest 
(and the populations that inhabit them and the surrounding areas) as expendable resources, 
valuable only insofar as they serve economic, militaristic, or propagandistic purposes for the 
Federal government is examined. 
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PREFACE 
 
This project developed out of a paper I wrote for an undergraduate seminar course on the 
U. S. West.  The original idea for the work was a general examination of how the United States’ 
atomic weapons program embodied historical themes associated with the U. S. West.  After 
receiving some literature regarding public outcry about a scheduled weapons experiment at the 
Nevada Test Site from a friend residing in the hamlet of Rockville, Utah, I began doing more 
extensive research into the experiences of people in downwind communities during the 
atmospheric testing period.  The following summer of 2007, I visited Rockville, which is located 
in Washington County, Utah, and developed a personal connection with the area and its people.  
The paper I wrote led me to many more questions than answers, and the time I spent there that 
summer convinced me that I should continue to pursue the topic.   
In a way, I am also now a downwinder, as I have had this metaphorical radioactive cloud 
of a research project hovering over my life for the last seven years.  While the research phase of 
the process was exhilarating, I found the daunting challenge of composing the finished product 
to be depressing, frustrating, and frightening.  Many changes occurred over that span, and life’s 
challenges have a way of clarifying one’s purpose, even if not making the path less strenuous.  I 
lived the majority of the first quarter century of my existence within forty miles of a nuclear 
power plant.  My father worked as a contract administrator at the Edwin I. Hatch nuclear plant 
for twenty-two years, from the time I was five years old, so I grew up with nuclear power as an 
unquestioned fact of life.  It was not until the winter of 2006 that I began to question the tenets 
and origins of nuclear technology, and perhaps the disillusionment of the realizations that 
followed unavoidably tainted my project.  Still, I found Washington County’s role in the 
development of a national nuclear program to be compelling. 
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During the course of my research, I realized that there was no precedent for the manner in 
which I intended to tell the story, no framework which had already been built by secondary 
scholars.  While several scholars from the fields of history, political science, journalism, and 
sociology have examined the topic from the perspectives of their chosen disciplines, no 
historians had dealt with the subject from the point of view of a specific community.  Therefore, 
I chose Washington County, Utah, as the location upon which to center my focus.   
In his 1986 book, Justice Downwind, Howard Ball approached the subject from an 
epidemiologic point of view and told the story from information revealed in the downwinders’ 
landmark court case, Irene Allen et al. v. United States.  Ball, then a political science professor 
specializing in civil rights, constitutional law, and the judicial process, cursorily dealt with St. 
George, but did not discuss any communities in Washington County.  He examined the 
development of the nuclear weapons complex and the Atomic Energy Commission’s (AEC) 
association with national security, the responses of downwinders and their cancer incidence, the 
medical controversy in linking radioactive fallout and cancer, and the progression and impact of 
the Allen trial.  Ball concluded that the government had violated the civil rights of downwinders 
and that the judge’s decision in the Allen trial was the first step in setting right the injuries they 
had suffered. 
The same year, Constandina Titus, a political science professor at UNLV, former Nevada 
state senator, and current Nevada congresswoman in the U. S. House of Representatives, 
published Bombs in the Backyard in which she related the nuclear testing program to the 
overarching American political scene.  Titus, who also worked with the National Atomic Testing 
Museum located in Las Vegas, Nevada, attempted to make the case that the AEC did not deceive 
the public through various public relations campaigns, but merely argued effectively that 
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experimenting with nuclear weapons on American soil was necessary even if the possibility of 
endangering public health was a consequence.  Titus dealt only cursorily with subjects from 
Washington County, choosing instead to focus primarily on the southern Nevada region in 
relation to the testing program.  While she did acknowledge the economic benefits to southern 
Nevada from the testing program, Titus ultimately found that the government conducted its 
nuclear experiments as a result of the existential threat posed by the U.S.S.R. 
A few years later, after the federal government had made its judicial appeals, Philip L. 
Fradkin released Fallout:  An American Nuclear Tragedy.  Fradkin was a journalist who covered 
the Vietnam War and environmental issues for several publications including the Los Angeles 
Times, and also served as editor for Audubon magazine and taught writing at Stanford University 
and the University of California, Berkeley.  Fradkin utilized the Allen trial as the framework for 
his telling of the story and covered issues related to the involved governmental agencies, legal 
defense and prosecution teams, the testing facility, individual test shots, victims, nuclear 
scientists, and Judge Jenkins’ decision in the Allen trial.  He concluded that an appeals court’s 
decision to overturn Jenkins’ decision was yet another injustice the federal government delivered 
upon the downwinders. 
In the early 1990s, Barton C. Hacker published the second of two volumes in which he 
examined the history and progress of the AEC’s radiological safety program, from its inception 
in 1946 through its dissolution in 1975.  Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, a prime 
contractor of the U. S. Department of Energy’s Nevada Operations Office, had contracted 
Hacker in 1978 to work on this project.  By 1992, Hacker had accepted the position of Lab 
Historian for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory at the University of California, 
Livermore.  Hacker attempted to tell the story of the effects of the radiological safety efforts of 
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the nuclear weapons testing program from both the perspective of scientists and downwinders.  
Hacker described the efforts he exerted in order to remain dispassionate and objective about his 
subject matter, and he achieved his goal in this work.  Hacker was thorough in describing the 
fallout accidents during the Simon and Harry Shots of 1953, but his treatment of Washington 
County was also very limited. 
Environmental sociologist Valerie Kuletz published The Tainted Desert:  Environmental 
and Social Ruin in the American West in 1998, in which she examined the social and 
environmental impacts of what she termed “nuclearism.”  The daughter of a nuclear weapons 
scientist who studied at the University of California, Santa Cruz, Kuletz dealt with the social and 
environmental costs in the desert West from the 1940s through the 1990s, focusing her work on 
the dichotomy between sacred homeland and sacrificial wasteland.  She took into account the 
perspectives of Native Americans, antinuclear activists, scientists, and government officials, and, 
while she dealt with the problems associated with downwinders, she addressed them as a group 
and did not specifically focus on any particular area.  Kuletz concluded that radiation 
contamination continues to pose a threat to humans because of water issues, and that in order to 
address the threat of radiation contamination humans must address their increasing alienation 
from nature. 
Charles Loeber’s 2002 work, Building the Bombs:  A History of the Nuclear Weapons 
Complex, is a history of the origins and development of the various programs and offices which 
comprise the cumulative atomic weapons production and testing apparatus.  Loeber, a former 
employee of the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office and Sandia National Laboratories, 
composed this book in response to requests for the materials he used during presentations he 
gave at the Albuquerque Operations Office of the history and missions of the nuclear weapons 
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complex.  He began with a review of Albert Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity and brought 
the story up to the current challenges of the new millennium in maintaining stockpiles and 
appropriate nuclear deterrents.  It is a work of general history, and Loeber did not give much 
attention to the Nevada Test Site and only a passing reference in his epilogue to the experiences 
of downwind residents.   
I have felt that I was on a ledge with this project from the moment I realized the 
immensity of the subject with which I intended to grapple, with no framework for writing a 
proper history that would do justice to both the topic and the people affected.  I felt compelled to 
tell the story of the people who were at greatest risk of injury, and to try to understand how a 
community of individuals who felt they were authoring their own destinies could resign itself to 
the whims of ambitious politicians and scientists.  I had originally intended to build the story by 
researching three aspects of Washington County:  social structure, environment, and politics.  
After gathering sources and evidence, especially from the Washington County News, I realized 
that these Washingtonians had an economic motivation and were extremely patriotic, two 
important facets of the story which I had initially overlooked.  The work that follows is my 
attempt to tell a complex and heart-wrenching story and to capture the spirit of the people of 
Washington County who lived in the shadow of the atomic weapons experiments at NTS.   
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WESTERN SKIES AND THREATENING CLOUDS 
“Even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating 
retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives 
that would be inflicted by surprise aggression....  Let no one think that the expenditure of vast 
sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens 
of any nation.”—Dwight David Eisenhower1 
 
During the period of the United States’ atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, 1951-1963, 
radioactive by-products rained down on communities across the entire country.  This period 
coincided with the onset of the Cold War, in which the American people believed that 
experimentation with nuclear devices would help to deter an attack on their homeland by the 
United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).  This radioactive fallout, while heaviest and most 
dangerous in areas near the testing sites, created potentially serious health consequences for all 
living beings that came into contact with it.  However, the communities located within a few 
hundred miles of the testing sites were in the most danger from radioactive contamination.   
Washington County, Utah, was one such community that was hit particularly hard with 
radioactive fallout.  Its population, predominantly members of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints (LDS), was extremely patriotic in its support of America’s position during the 
Cold War.  Primarily due to the limited public understanding of the effects of radiation, there 
was little concern for short-term, localized effects or the long-term, environmental effects of 
radiation contamination.  Also contributing to the lack of public awareness was a concerted 
effort on the part of government officials to convince the American people, especially those 
living in the nearby vicinity of the testing program, that the weapons tests were crucial to 
thwarting an impending Soviet attack.  Finally, the prevailing economic philosophy that land 
must in some way prove to be economically beneficial, as well as the fact that large amounts of 
                                                 
1
 Presidential Address Document no. 256, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:  Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, 1953-1960 (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1960).  Address Before the United Nations 
General Assembly, December 8, 1953, p. 816.  Hereafter cited as Eisenhower, Papers. 
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federal funds flowed into the area as a result of ongoing Cold War military-industrial expansion, 
meant that very few people thought to question the practice of testing nuclear weapons in 
Americans’ backyards. 
In many ways, the experiences of Washington County residents with radioactive fallout 
from nuclear weapons tests typify the historical experiences of people living in the American 
West.  The people who lived in this area during the period of atmospheric nuclear weapons 
testing, like those Americans who had sought out the western frontier as a refuge a century 
earlier, faced unknown and unforeseen dangers;  boom and bust mining, agriculture, and 
commercial enterprises; exploitation of the West’s people and resources for large corporations in 
the eastern states; the presence of military personnel and installations; an influx of federal dollars 
intended to expand the profitability of the region’s business ventures; and an increasing trend of 
rural western populations to urbanize.  Ultimately, however, the conquest of an apparently 
inhospitable land for national and economic gain is the western historical theme that figures most 
heavily in the history of the United States’ nuclear weapons testing period.2   
For many Americans, the mention of the “American West” calls up fantastical images of 
noble cowboys, savage Indians, and a vast, untamed wilderness.  This is the result of an idealized 
mental picture of the “Old West” which can be largely attributed to the focus placed on this 
timeless locale by Hollywood’s motion pictures.  But the American West is more than just the 
Old West that is dead and gone; it is also the Contemporary West, a dynamic place without 
explicitly defined spatial boundaries and which acts upon the inhabitants as much as they act 
upon it.  The true, complex nature of the contemporary American West serves to propagate the 
                                                 
2
 For a more detailed exegesis of the themes which historians associate with America’s Western frontier, see 
Richard Etulain, Beyond the Missouri:  The Story of the American West, Albuquerque:  University of New Mexico 
Press, 2006; Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest:  The Unbroken Past of the American West, New 
York and London:  W.W. Norton, 2006 (1987); and William Cronon, George Miles, and Jay Gitlin, eds., Under an 
Open Sky:  Rethinking America’s Western Past, New York and London:  W.W. Norton, 1992. 
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idea that Hollywood’s images are accurate; it is easier to simplify wrongly a complex situation 
than to work through the complexities.  Yet, these perceptions do not seem to be wholly 
inaccurate.  The concept of an untamed wilderness is true to a large extent, if one takes into 
account lands owned by the federal government, federally protected nature preserves, and 
restricted-access military installations.  The truth, which is not told by the pretty pictures of a 
pristine wilderness painted either by Hollywood or the tourism advertisements of the National 
Park Service, is that the landscape has been, and still is, under attack. 
 The seemingly barren regions of desert that comprise much of the states of Arizona, 
California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah are homes to numerous military installations.  These 
installations serve various functions, from U.S. Air Force bombing ranges to U.S. Department of 
Energy research laboratories, nuclear weapons detonation/waste disposal sites, and even a naval 
weapons center in the middle of the Mojave Desert.  Several share at least one border with a 
National Wildlife Refuge (NWR):  the White Sands Missile Range and Fort Bliss Military 
Reserve in New Mexico completely surround the San Andreas NWR and the White Sands 
National Monument, and the Nevada Test Site and Nellis Air Force Range adjoin the Desert 
National Wildlife Range in Nevada.  Most of these sites have been labeled as “No Public 
Access” areas, and six of the bases in Nevada are simply designated as “Restricted Military 
Areas.”  Officials considered deserts to be perfect locations for these installations, as there tends 
to be relatively few inhabitants and very little traffic in the surrounding areas.  Furthermore, the 
desert provides for easily-observable, strategically-defensible borders.  As a region that is too 
foreboding for many humans to inhabit, and which serves the interests of a federal government 
that is seemingly in need of such military installations, the barren deserts of the American West 
do, in fact, offer some utility to Americans.   
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 In keeping with the tradition of Old West boomtowns, the U.S. government, on all levels, 
has treated the deserts of the American West as expendable resources, useful only insofar as they 
can be exploited for the economic needs or desires of American society.  But, whereas people 
were able to re-inhabit the abandoned mining towns long after the profiteers had moved on to 
richer veins, it will be a very long time before the western deserts will be rid of the effects of the 
testing projects conducted there during the last sixty years.  The conditions under which it 
became necessary to adopt this policy of environmental negligence were created during the 
Second World War.  It was during this period that all facets of American society and resources 
were drawn upon, and not even the desert wastelands were spared a part in the war. 
 Prior to World War II, the U.S. West remained an industrially and economically 
underdeveloped region, completely dependent on the East for all financially viable activity, as it 
had served as a supplier of raw materials which were refined and manufactured into goods in 
Eastern industrial hubs.3  There had been no need to develop a large industrial base in the West, 
since the railroad had been built to make transportation of those raw materials to the East much 
easier.  Furthermore, there was no labor base in the American West:  as of the 1940 census, the 
West accounted for half of the nation’s land area, but less than fifteen percent of the total 
population.4  However, when the U.S. began to mobilize for war in 1941, the West began to 
receive large portions of the federal funds appropriated for the production of agricultural, 
industrial, and military goods.  With much of the country still feeling the effects of the Great 
Depression, people followed the money. 
In particular, funds appropriated for the military led to the creation and development of 
manufacturing and industrial assembly plants across much of the West.  As well, the needs of the 
                                                 
3
 Gerald D. Nash, The American West Transformed:  The Impact of the Second World War, Bloomington:  Indiana 
University Press, 1985, p. 14. 
4
 Ibid., p. 10. 
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military and the availability of inexpensive land helped to create an atmosphere which was 
conducive to the new aerospace and electronics industries.  With the federal government 
spending large amounts of money to finance the capital required to produce the American war 
machine, these plants provided a multitude of new jobs in the western U.S. alone.  This spurred a 
new westward migration of people still trying to recover from the effects of the Depression, and 
this new population provided the workforce for the blossoming production industries, as well as 
the tertiary support service industry which emerged in order to meet the demand for emerging 
community and cultural services.5 
The economic impact of the $70 billion allocated by Congress from 1941-1945 for 
western development was critical to the war in the Pacific.6  President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
believed that the West had a great potential to provide support for the Allied forces in the Pacific, 
and he made sure that funding was adequate to actualize that potential.7  Those states which 
lacked the necessary conditions to support large urban populations (and, therefore, industry) or 
agricultural lands were not deprived of these funds.  Rather, the federal government spent a large 
portion of that money to establish military “training camps, air bases, testing facilities and 
storage depots” which transformed the West into the primary locale for the ever-expanding 
military-industrial complex.8   
The major factor for this development, the great potential which Roosevelt saw, was the 
impression of a barren region.  While it would be erroneous to believe that these places were 
completely devoid of humans, such a relatively uninhabited region did not exist in the eastern 
half of the country.  In the West, large amounts of land in remote locations could accommodate 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
6
 Ibid., p. 19. 
7
 Etulain, Beyond the Missouri, p. 363. 
8
 Nash, American West Transformed, p. 24. 
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large increases in populations.  Furthermore, the federal government remained the sole proprietor 
of most of the West.  The desert wastelands, while extremely unattractive to immigrants, offered 
an isolation which federal and scientific administrators coveted for experiments involving 
technological advancements requiring immense stretches of unoccupied land.9  Considering the 
defense capability in the area, it made sense to establish the most sensitive of the nation’s new 
scientific research facilities in close proximity to these military installations.  But, it also meant 
that the federal government, along with the U.S. military, would establish a connection with the 
scientific community which it intended to exploit. 
The most important of the military’s wartime scientific endeavors was the Manhattan 
Engineer District, also known as the Manhattan Project.  In 1939, physicists Albert Einstein and 
Leo Szilard sent a letter to Roosevelt warning of the likelihood that Germany was working 
toward the construction of a new military weapon capable of harnessing the power of the newly 
hypothesized theory of fission.  Einstein and Szilard proposed that the government begin a 
search to find private investors to fund a similar venture in America.10  Roosevelt responded 
within two months that he had called together a group of officials in order to explore the 
prospects of building and properly funding such a weapon.11  However, it was not until the 
summer of 1941 that President Roosevelt authorized Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development, to begin research and development of the project.  Private 
investors did not fund the project; the federal government tightly controlled the operation.  The 
Manhattan Project officially became a federal program when government officials called upon 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., pp. 18-9. 
10
 “Einstein’s Letter to Roosevelt,” in Michael B. Stoff, et al., eds, The Manhattan Project:  A Documentary 
Introduction to the Atomic Age, Philadelphia:  Temple University Press, 1991, pp. 18-9. 
11
 Ibid., p. 20. 
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Brigadier General Leslie Richard Groves in the summer of 1942 to oversee the operation for the 
War Department.12 
One of the features which resulted from the urgency of this top-secret project was to 
divide the operation into different jobs positioned in various parts of the country.  This was done 
in order to move the operation forward at a faster pace by harnessing the capital of existing 
facilities and hiring corporations which could quickly build new ones.  Thus, various 
components of the overall project found housing in such eastern locations as Tennessee and 
Illinois, and at Columbia and Princeton Universities.  But the sites of more sensitive operations 
were situated in the western states of Washington, Idaho, and New Mexico.  It was at Los 
Alamos, New Mexico, that head scientist Julius Robert Oppenheimer decided to establish the site 
of the on-going experiments, as well as the location of the final assembly and testing of the first 
atomic bomb.  Under the leadership and hard work of Groves and Oppenheimer, the federal 
government realized that isolated facilities of vital national interest were well worth the expense 
of placing them in the Western desert. 
With these new scientific laboratories in place and working feverishly toward their 
objective, the next step, to find a suitable location at which to test the final product, began in 
May 1944.  The criteria for such a place were extremely specific:  the location must be relatively 
close to Los Alamos in order to transport the personnel and equipment; the weather must be fair 
and predictable to a great degree; lands belonging to American Indians should remain untouched; 
and, it was necessary that the landscape be reasonably smooth in order to provide the most 
accurate data regarding blast effects and to extend the possible range of visual observations.13  
Major W. A. (Lex) Stevens and Kenneth Tompkins Bainbridge reviewed the three sites that were 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., p. 17. 
13
 Ferenc Morton Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice:  The Story of the Trinity Site Nuclear Explosion, July 16, 
1945, Albuquerque:  University of New Mexico Press, 1984, pp. 27. 
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most promising, all in deserts, before selecting the area of the Jornada del Muerto (Spanish, 
“Journey of Death”) in south-central New Mexico.14  It became known as the Trinity Site, and it 
was here that the efforts of the massive Manhattan Project were put to the test. 
On July 16, 1945, Trinity erupted in the world’s first test of a nuclear weapon.  General 
Groves, in a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson, stated that “the test was 
successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone.”15  The explosion sent a 
radioactive mushroom cloud billowing over 10,000 feet in the air before it “was sent in several 
directions by the variable winds at the different elevations.  It deposited its dust and radioactive 
materials over a wide area.”16  Personnel, including doctors, were stationed in various locations 
around the test site to measure the levels of radiation and assist with any mishaps.  But, 
according to Groves, “at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the 
population.”17  In fact, officials believed that a few cattle and sheep had been the only casualties 
of the experiment.18 
The fact of the matter, however, is that even the scientists most closely connected with 
the intricacies of the experiment were unsure of the “safe” levels of radiation.  Moreover, the 
military was only concerned with the well-being of the citizens insofar as it involved civilian 
leaders in politics.  The administration valued the project as an instrument which would help to 
end a costly war and which would establish the United States as the world power; there was no 
pause for concern about the possible ruination of land because federal authorities already 
considered the region worthless.  There was no ecological philosophy to warn that “unless we 
                                                 
14
 Ibid., p. 28. 
15
 “Groves Memo to Stimson, July 18, 1945,” in Stoff, The Manhattan Project, p. 188. 
16
 Ibid., p. 189. 
17
 Ibid., p. 189. 
18
 Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy:  The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear 
Weapons Testing, 1947-1974, Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 1994, p. 4. 
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can think of nature as being a source of value, and not a mere resource upon which we project 
our interests, we will be unable to believe in the importance of limits to our technological 
remaking of nature.”19  Indeed, the scientific belief in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in 
research, coupled with a subordinate position to the federal government, prevented the scientific 
community from imposing a moral culpability either upon themselves or upon the experiments 
which they were conducting.  Because the weather was an uncontrollable variable that 
unavoidably affected nuclear experiments, this attitude of limited liability would prove 
disastrous. 
When President Harry S. Truman ordered a nuclear strike on Japan in August 1945, there 
was some dissent among his top advisers as to the efficacy of dropping an experimental weapon 
of uncertain devastation, with the most notable opposition emanating from future President 
Dwight David Eisenhower.20  The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although meant 
primarily as instruments for averting a land invasion of Japan and bringing about a quicker 
resolution to the war with Japan, were also meant to be further tests of bomb design and 
capability.  Scientists considered the design of the bomb to be “primitive,” although within four 
short months, “it was estimated that 90,000 people had died in Hiroshima because of the effects 
of one atomic bomb.”21   
Many contemporaries argued that people who questioned the ethics of using the bomb to 
end World War II implied that it was better to let the soldiers die than use the bomb and that 
those people were generally not the ones whose lives were at stake.22  However, Joshua Reuben 
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Clark, Jr., former Undersecretary of State to President Calvin Coolidge, disagreed with this 
position and argued that the  
bomb was the ‘crowning cruelty’, in a war that witnessed history’s greatest onslought 
[sic] against civilian populations....  If we are to avoid extermination, if the world is not 
to be wiped out, we must find some way to curb the fiendish ingenuity of men who have 
no fear of God, man or the Devil….  I protest with all the energy I possess against this 
fiendish activity, and call on our government to see that this terrible CURSE being 
proposed is stopped.23 
 
Most contemporaries disagreed with Clark’s position, and one of his critics claimed that “Clark 
could see only one side of the enigma.  The bomb was not a ‘Curse’, it saved millions of lives.”24 
The federal government, as opposed to the scientific community, did have to be 
concerned with liability and public perceptions regarding its peacetime nuclear weapons testing 
program.  At the end of World War II, U.S. officials believed that they had a monopoly on 
atomic weapons technology that would last for approximately one decade, and it was an 
advantage that they intended to exploit.  The directors of the Manhattan Project determined that 
the Trinity Site was not an ideal setting for a nuclear proving ground, since populations were at 
risk from wind-blown, radioactive fallout.25  A search began to find a suitable location for a 
nuclear testing facility; the committee assigned to the search released its findings in a report 
entitled “Project Nutmeg.”  The committee reported that, due to geographical and political 
worries, the creation of a test site within the boundaries of the continental U.S. was impractical.  
It further recommended that the facility established at the Pacific Proving Grounds (PPG) in the 
Marshall Islands should be utilized unless a national emergency required the government to 
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establish a “CONUS” (continental U.S.) test site.  Thus, project directors decided to move further 
testing operations to the newly acquired Marshall Islands in the North Pacific Ocean, where 
testing recommenced in July 1946 with two detonations aimed at experimenting with the effects 
of a nuclear blast on naval vessels. 
Although the provisions of the bill did not take effect until January 1947, Congress 
passed the Atomic Energy Act in late July 1946, which took control of atomic energy and 
weapons programs from the military and placed it in the hands of the civilian Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC).26  The AEC was not created to be a part of the presidential cabinet, but to be 
“an independent agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government.”27  The military was 
not completely eliminated from the nuclear scene, however.  The 1946 act contained a provision 
for the establishment of a Military Liaison Committee, which was to be updated fully on all 
aspects of the nuclear program which the committee thought concerned the military.28  This only 
represented a small contingent of the military apparatus compared with the multiple agencies 
later created to “help” the AEC conduct its nuclear weapons tests.  In the meantime, testing 
continued at the Pacific Proving Grounds. 
A series of “emergency” situations surfaced beginning in the late summer of 1949 that 
ultimately led to the creation of a continental test site.  On September 23, 1949, President 
Truman announced to the nation that the USSR had successfully detonated an atomic device, 
nearly one month after the test had occurred on August 29.  National newspaper headlines on 
September 24 illustrated the shock to the national psyche, and the numerous follow-up articles 
on the front pages also dealt with some aspect of the crisis, although they urged U.S. citizens not 
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to be alarmed.29  While some U.S. officials attempted to bolster national confidence by stating 
publicly that this was not an unexpected development, other officials openly criticized the public 
relations’ handling of the situation.30  Also, there were members of Congress and Pentagon 
officials, including Louis Arthur Johnson, Truman’s second Secretary of Defense, who 
questioned the veracity of the reports of the Soviet achievement.31 
Then, in June 1950, the United States became involved in the Korean War after the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (backed by the USSR) invaded the Republic of Korea.  
U.S. officials became concerned that the war would threaten shipping lanes across the Pacific 
Ocean.  On July 13, 1950, AEC Chairman Gordon Evans Dean wrote the Chairman of the 
Military Liaison Committee to suggest that the AEC and DOD (Department of Defense) 
collaborate to find a continental test site.32  Among the possible locations under consideration, 
several were located along the Atlantic seaboard.  One-by-one, however, officials abandoned 
these sites as possible testing locations “for one principal reason:  the government did not own 
the land and did not want to wait to go through the process of acquiring it.”33  On the other hand, 
the federal government did own vast amounts of “barren” land in the western states, and such a 
location would also mean that the test site would be in closer proximity to the Los Alamos 
Scientific Laboratories, the main research facility for the federal nuclear weapons program.34 
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At a meeting in December 1950, the AEC decided that a new facility should be 
established in Nevada.35  Initially referred to as the Nevada Proving Ground, construction began 
on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) on January 1, 1951.  Located in Nye County, sixty-five miles 
northwest of Las Vegas, it originally encompassed nearly 600 square miles of land and was 
bordered by the U.S. Air Force gunnery range (AFGR), an additional 4,000-plus square miles.36  
The site was chosen for several reasons, the foremost of which were the sparse population and 
ease of acquisition; it was mostly comprised of lands already owned by the federal government; 
and all additional lands were acquired either from the state or from private citizens.  Prior to 
1951, when construction of NTS began, the area encompassed by the installation was used for 
“mining, grazing, and hunting.”37  By 1977, the combination of the Tonopah Test Range, Nellis 
Air Force Range, and the Nevada Test Site military facilities comprised one of the largest 
contiguous areas of land in the United States.38 
Officials chose a site in Nevada despite their own admission that a location on the eastern 
seaboard would be preferable to any location in the interior of the country, as “prevailing 
westerly winds over any western site would blow fallout over most of the country and despite the 
fact that after the Trinity test Stafford Leak Warren (Chief of Radiological Safety) had 
recommended that tests not be done in locations with human habitations within a 150-mile 
radius.”39  An east coast testing site would have blown potentially hazardous fallout into the 
Atlantic Ocean, away from population centers.  But the American West was the preferred 
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location, as politicians and entrepreneurs have historically viewed the region as the most 
politically feasible and economically beneficial area of the nation to sacrifice.  While officials 
already had experience in windblown fallout with the Trinity and Marshall Islands experiments, 
they still chose to situate the CONUS in a locale which would deposit fallout on population 
centers and the entire country.40   
Furthermore, the political climate of the early years of the Cold War between the United 
States and USSR contributed to this attitude that certain sacrifices were necessary to ensure the 
survival of the western way of life, i.e., republican capitalism.  Many politicians, military 
officials, and influential citizens had come to believe that there existed a communist conspiracy 
to participate actively in the overthrow of American supremacy in world affairs.  In the early 
years, politicians engaged in a concerted effort to express to the American public that the Soviet 
Union posed a very serious, existential threat.  It was in this context that the AEC’s nuclear 
weapons testing program at the Nevada Test Site began.  When operations commenced at the 
NTS, the science behind nuclear fission was little more than a decade old.  Yet, the enormous 
destructive power unleashed by the military application of this burgeoning new science helped to 
solidify Americans’ belief in an inherent cultural, intellectual, and social superiority over the 
Soviets.  This sense of superiority led many politicians, AEC officials, and citizens to reach 
conclusions which were not supported—or, were directly refuted—by scientific evidence and 
turn a blind eye to egregious violations of human rights. 
Evidence from early atomic detonations pointed to the potentially devastating effects of 
nuclear radiation on biological populations.  Following the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, 
which are repeatedly referred to and listed as tests, a study by the Los Alamos Scientific 
Laboratory found that “if the bomb burst occurred relatively close to the ground, a situation 
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which would be uneconomical from the standpoint of the destructive effect, and considerable 
amounts of dirt and other debris were sucked into the radioactive cloud, the fall-out would have 
to be considered as a danger.”41  Then, following the tests on the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall 
Islands, research conducted jointly by the AEC and the University of Washington Applied 
Fisheries Laboratory showed that food sources, flora, and fauna located on the atoll were still 
radioactive, although the official assessment was that these levels did not pose an external 
contamination danger to humans.42  In the face of contrary evidence, a great many officials and 
politicians directly or indirectly attributed “‘scare stories’” about the dangers of radioactive 
fallout to Soviet antagonists.43 
Once the USSR achieved atomic capability, U.S. officials and the general public came to 
understand the importance of maintaining nuclear superiority over their new nemesis.  It became 
imperative to increase both the size of the nuclear arsenal and to create more powerful and 
efficient weapons and conveyance systems.44  As stated in the Civil Defense Administration’s 
pamphlet, Personal Preparedness in the Nuclear Age, the government promoted the idea that the 
best approach to dealing with the Soviet nuclear threat was to negotiate from a position of 
strength, to “maintain and improve our strength on all fronts—spiritual, economic, and 
military—if we are to remain free.”45  It was incumbent not only on the nuclear agency to 
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maintain an effective stockpile of nuclear arms, but also on “the capability of the individual for 
self-protection at home and at work—in the cities and towns and on the farms.  Development of 
this capability is the chief contribution you can make toward bringing about a worldwide 
decision for lasting peace.”46  One contemporary who witnessed a nuclear test later wrote, “I was 
extremely ignorant about what I had seen.  But,... it had given me an absurd sense of 
superiority....  As part of this [sense of entry into a “secret world”] I had gotten the idea that 
these aboveground tests were both necessary and important.”47 
When the American people elected World War II general and American hero Dwight 
David Eisenhower to the presidency in the fall of 1952, they voted into office a man they 
presumed would take a strong stance against Soviet nuclear aggression.  But Eisenhower 
ultimately called for global harmony and for atomic energy to be utilized for beneficial purposes 
rather than for large-scale devastation.48  During his famous 1953 speech, “Atoms for Peace,” at 
the United Nations General Assembly, Eisenhower declared that the “United States would seek 
more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes.  It is not 
enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers.  It must be put into the hands of 
those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.”49  He even 
went so far as to assert that, “We have never, we never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet 
Union surrender what is rightfully theirs.  We will never say that the people of Russia are an 
enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful 
relationship.”50  Despite these declarations, however, it was Eisenhower who oversaw a major 
escalation of financial funding to experiment with new weapons, ultimately leading the United 
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States to increase its nuclear arsenal immensely during his two-term presidency, and, 
consequently, a parallel Soviet effort.51 
Late in the atmospheric testing period, the Cold War culture, which posited the Soviet 
Union as evil and the United States as the good nation destined to oppose the evil expansion of 
communism to the freedom-loving peoples of the world, produced an interesting pamphlet 
whose contents reveal a great deal about popular public sentiment.  Entitled Manual for Survival:  
How to Survive an A-Bomb Attack, this pamphlet seems to have first appeared in 1961.  The 
authors of the pamphlet contend that “the Russians have the power to launch an overwhelming 
atomic attack on the U.S. this very minute.  They can if they want to.”52  Furthermore, the 
chance that they would attack was greater since “the rulers of Russia have no such respect for 
human life as we do,” and the likely result of such an attack would be that “life as we know it in 
America may be suspended for a while.”53  While the authors admitted that the majority of 
laypersons in the United States did not fully understand the way in which nuclear physics 
worked, they asserted that “[t]he caveman of many thousands of years ago feared fire, because 
he did not understand it.  When his ancestors learned enough about fire to use it, it became one 
of the most beneficial developments in human history.”54  This message of national propaganda 
posited that, if there was ever a group of people prepared to face such a situation, it must surely 
be American citizens, since 
Standing up to danger is nothing new to Americans.  The first Americans braved the 
threat of stormy seas to come to this wild and unknown country.  They endured the 
staggering blows of nature.  They fought through the savage onslaughts of Indians.  And 
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they not only survived, they built a nation destined to become the ideal of every man on 
Earth who yearns to call himself free.55 
 
The patriotic population of Washington County, Utah, believed themselves to be the 
natural inheritors of such stalwart determination.  For the most part, they were the descendants of 
Mormon pioneers, people who had been persecuted in eastern states for their religious beliefs 
and who had resolutely braved the hardships of life in a harsh environment in order to establish 
their own societal enclave.  By the time of the establishment of the NTS, they had become a 
community of people who had fully embraced the American idealism that would pervade 1950s 
American life.  They had adopted a “total personal commitment to Church, family, and flag.”56  
These people tended to believe that, as far as nuclear testing and the USSR were concerned, the 
American government and people were responsible for preventing Soviet encroachment into 
territories where democracy ruled.57   
Thus, when AEC and other government officials told the people of Washington County 
that they had nothing to fear from small levels of radioactive fallout that began occurring with 
the first atomic detonations at NTS, the population put full faith and credit in their reassurances.  
Newspaper editorials from the Washington County News for the years of atmospheric testing 
reveal that while the populace expressed some anxiety, fear, and paranoia regarding the nearby 
tests, they conceded that the explosions conducted at NTS were essential to national security.  
While no one wanted to live so close to the test facility, these people accepted it as necessary, 
and believed that they could continue to lead lives without being hindered by the nuclear 
experiments.58 
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What neither they nor the rest of the American population understood, was that the tests 
were precisely that, experiments conducted in order to study in further detail the intricacies of 
nuclear physics, a field which scientists had barely begun to study.   The AEC conducted tests 
both “to develop and improve nuclear weapons” and to evaluate the effects of radiation on the 
surrounding environment.59  At the time, many scientists believed that radiation exposure was 
harmless unless a person’s exposure exceeded a certain level.  Known as the Threshold Theory, 
it held widespread support despite the fact that there were some studies whose foundational 
evidence directly contradicted the basic premises of the theory.  However, it was not until the 
waning years of the atmospheric testing program that AEC officials and scientists publicly 
acknowledged that exposure to low-level doses of radiation could have serious debilitative health 
consequences for living organisms.  Even then, they tended to downplay the degree to which 
humans may be affected, and in many cases even implied that the dangers of radioactive fallout 
were limited to fallout created by enemy bombs.60 
However, friendly/enemy status did not limit the dangers of radioactive fallout.  By 1964, 
one year after the official end of the atmospheric testing period, there had been 340 announced 
nuclear detonations by the U.S., USSR, France, and Great Britain.  The result was that the “total 
energy released has been about 511 million tons (MT) equivalent of TNT,” which would have 
injected around thirty-one tons of fissionable decay material into the atmosphere by 1964.61  The 
people living within 200 miles downwind of testing areas were most susceptible to the 
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radioactive fallout produced by nuclear detonations.  Later studies have shown that these 
downwind populations were more likely to develop leukemia than their counterparts in other 
areas of the nation.62  Furthermore, “the psychological effects of nuclear catastrophes may be 
equally, if not more, prevalent than their physical health consequences,” since it is possible that a 
persistent state of dread of contracting some form of cancer or other terminal disease may induce 
certain physical maladies if these fears are “reinforced when cancers and other illnesses occur 
among survivors and are attributed, rightly or wrongly, to the radiation exposure.”63 
This is precisely the phenomena which residents of Washington County experienced 
from 1951 to 1963, and, indeed, in the decades since the end of the atmospheric testing period.  
While most residents supported the testing program and believed the AEC’s false assertions 
during the testing period, there were some who, from the very beginning, questioned the validity 
of the claims and the extent to which their health and the health of their relatives was 
compromised as a result of radiation exposure.  There still exists in Washington County a sharp 
divide between those people who believe that the government falsified information and 
compromised the health of local residents and those who think that the claims of downwind 
radiation exposure is the result of a conspiratorial mindset among certain segments of the 
population.  While these differing opinions may never receive a definitive resolution, it is 
indisputable that the bombs detonated in the nearby Nevada desert altered not only the landscape 
and environment, but also the lives of the people of Washington County, Utah. 
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PATRIOTIC POPULACE:  WASHINGTON COUNTY RESIDENTS AND THE COLD WAR 
“A lot of times in St. George, Cedar City, some of those small towns up in central Utah, the 
teachers would take the students out to watch the blast.  And we were getting the story up there 
[in Salt Lake City] that it was history in the making but it’s not dangerous....  And that simply 
wasn’t true and they knew it wasn’t true....  Intellectually and psychologically they probably 
could not believe that the government would, on purpose, deceive them.”—Marcel Eugene 
Bridges64 
 
Washington County, Utah, is a locale of extremes:  its landscape is magnificent, its 
citizenry is exceedingly warm and generous, and during the early years of the Cold War, 
Washingtonians were intense in their patriotic support of the United States’ efforts against the 
Soviet Union.  Content to live lives of communal interdependence, these people had a strong 
sense of individual self-reliance while still committing themselves to the welfare of the 
community as a whole.  While many residents farmed or ranched for their livings, others ran 
local retail businesses, served in the military, staffed local offices for federal programs, and 
participated in local fund-raising for charitable causes.  Many of these people held steadfastly to 
the belief that the federal government should remain as small as possible and should limit its 
involvement in its citizens’ everyday affairs, yet they roundly supported the federal 
government’s policies in foreign affairs, especially as related to the Soviet Union.  This included 
local cooperation with Atomic Energy Commission staff whenever they visited the area or 
released statements regarding the effects on the local community from Nevada Test Site nuclear 
weapons tests.  While some openly questioned the AEC’s assertions (in all likelihood, many 
more privately questioned these statements), general consensus seems to have been that the 
citizens of Washington County genuinely believed that the weapons testing program was in the 
best interest of national security. 
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Located in the extreme southwestern corner of Utah, Washington County encompasses 
1,553,037 acres of land, with 25,000 acres privately owned and another 66,000 acres set aside as 
wilderness areas; additionally, the Bureau of Land Management controls approximately 635,000 
acres.  The Utah Territorial Legislature formed the county on March 3, 1852, and the city of St. 
George became the county seat as of January 14, 1863.  By 1892, territorial legislature officials 
had formed the boundaries of the county as they exist today.65  Comprised mostly of small 
hamlets, with the city of St. George the exception, Washington County remained a relatively 
sparsely inhabited community into the 1950s and 1960s.  County population in 1950 was 9,836, 
and by 1960 it had only grown to 10,271; by 2010, the population had reached 130,529.66  In 
1953, the populations of the two largest towns was 4,545 in St. George and 1,268 in Hurricane, 
with many of the other inhabited areas of the county recording populations around 100.67 
Most of the residents of Washington County during this period were devout members of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.  In fact, throughout most communities in the 
state of Utah, the Mormon church serves as both the center of the community and a 
representation of the communal spirituality.68  It was, and largely still is, this religious facet of 
life that connected all members of the community.  For the Mormon population in general, 
acceptance into mainstream American culture had not occurred by the 1950s.  Therefore, in an 
attempt to legitimate their social standing as American citizens, the church strongly advocated 
total allegiance to the national agenda.  One long-time Utah resident, in an interview for an oral 
history project, stated that “Mormon people as a group of people... from birth they are taught that 
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you respect the government; you abide by the laws of the government.  And you’re taught that 
you were to be patriotic....  It was if the government said it, then that’s the way it was.”69  During 
World War II, communities from across Utah had sent young men and women into combat with 
the military; thirty-one from Washington County lost their lives during the war.70  The 1950s 
ushered in an era during which Washington County residents would pay a much higher price for 
their devout patriotism. 
These patriotic people were proud of their self-sufficiency.  Most had backyard gardens 
from which they harvested various fruits and vegetables for immediate consumption; those 
farmers who had large plots of cultivable land sold most of their surpluses to other locals.  The 
variety of local crops was astounding, and the Washington County News (WCN) reported that 
county farmers won county fair awards for the following crops:  grapes, peaches, apples, prunes, 
tomatoes, pears, pomegranates, persimmons, pecans, almonds, black walnuts, English walnuts, 
cucumber, pepper, cantaloupe, kohlrabi, squash, jujubes, potatoes, carrots, beets, onions, barley, 
wheat, and oats.71  Local ranchers raised livestock which, after slaughter, they sold locally or in 
adjoining counties.  There were also various dairy farmers who provided milk and dairy products 
to area residents who did not own at least one backyard cow, although many residents did own 
such an animal.  The result was that nearly all residents of Washington County consumed locally 
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raised food, a fact which created a great deal of pride, but which, as we will see, also became a 
detriment to the long-term health of these people.72 
Population growth in the county was quite slow, but with the 1950s came government 
programs which brought an increase in both in the number of residents and the amount of money 
circulating through the local economy.  Federal Civil Defense Administration (Civil Defense) 
offices employed local residents and provided the vital public service of educating citizens on 
ways that they could prepare for and survive a nuclear attack from an aggressor nation 
(specifically, the USSR).  The Washington County office also recruited volunteers to staff local 
observation posts for the Ground Observer Corps, a nationwide program which required several 
hundred thousand volunteers to monitor the skies above the United States for potential Soviet 
bombers.73  The biggest boon to the local economy from federal programs came from the 
construction and operation of the Hurricane Mesa Test Facility.  In 1954, the U.S. Air Force 
commissioned Coleman Engineering to construct and operate the facility which tested various 
cockpit systems for new Air Force fighter jets.74  Not only did these programs provide jobs to 
Washington County citizens, they also imbued to them a sense of pride in that they were active 
participants in the nation’s struggle against Communist aggression. 
Fear of a Soviet takeover of the United States and worldwide expansion was firmly 
entrenched in the psyche of Washingtonians in the 1950s.  The WCN regularly ran articles 
featuring syndicated columnists who promoted a conservative viewpoint and reinforced these 
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beliefs.75  After the announcement that the USSR had successfully detonated a hydrogen bomb 
on August 20, 1953, a cartoon appeared which portrayed Joseph Stalin as a dancing hydrogen 
bomb waving a Soviet flag and trumpeting a horn.76  An article in 1954 described the possibility 
that the Soviets had developed “an excellent rocket” which was “capable of crossing the Atlantic 
to bombard the United States” as a “sober” threat.77  A March 1957 front-page article described 
the concern caused “when twin vapor trails from either one or two high-flying jet aircraft came 
together and the area was rocked by an explosion only seconds later” which was “felt by 
hundreds of residents in St. George.”78  Finally, in 1958, assistant editor Nora R. Lyman reacted 
to the launch of Sputnik in her weekly column, “Observations.”  Lyman wrote that “Russia, with 
her lies, deceit, hypocracy [sic] and desire to dominate the whole world with Communism, has 
recently played what, so far, is her trumpcard with the release of Sputnik.”79  However, despite 
the threat posed by such a development, Lyman intimated that “What I fear more than anything 
else lies within our own borders.  I refer to Communist infiltration—in our schools, unions, 
government, secret weapons plants, communication, power and transportation systems.”80 
Given these sentiments, it is not surprising that there was limited outcry from 
Washingtonians to the news that atomic bombs would be detonated at the newly created NTS, 
with its extreme northeastern border located roughly 160 miles due east of St. George.  While 
federal officials issued formal announcements of the intention to create a test facility out of the 
Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range on January 11, 1951, the first mention in the WCN 
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came on January 25.  The article, printed at the behest of the AEC’s Las Vegas office, stated that 
“‘the U.S. atomic energy commission will use part of the Las Vegas bombing and gunnery range 
for test activities, including experimental nuclear detonations for the development of atomic 
bombs....  For national security reasons, there will be no public announcement prior to any 
tests.’”81  While the final paragraph of the report warned of dangers which may exist to “the 
careless, the curious and the hard-to-reach individuals” who might wander onto the test range, it 
further stated that “‘tests can be carried out with adequate assurance of safety under the 
conditions and controls prevailing at the bombing reservation.’”82  Citizens felt secure in the 
assurance that no harmful effects would escape the testing grounds, and there was a veritable 
sense of pride that national efforts based in close proximity to their community were impacting 
the campaign against the spread of communism.83 
The early propensity to view the activities at NTS in this way seems to have been 
prevalent among Americans across the nation.  Gallup poll data from early in the atmospheric 
testing period shows that the majority of Americans supported the testing program and did not 
worry about radioactive fallout.84  Even those living in close proximity to the test site felt that it 
was their duty to refrain from exploiting property damage claims for personal benefit.  During 
the first test series, citizens in the area surrounding Las Vegas filed 123 claims for property 
damage that totaled around $15,000.  Carrol L. Tyler, manager of the AEC office in Santa Fe, 
NM, reported that “It is noteworthy that the claims were almost all for actual costs of repairs and 
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were justifiable cases.”85  Furthermore, Tyler claimed that “in approximately one-tenth of the 
cases property owners waived all claims in the interest of national defense.”86  Following the 
second test series in the fall of 1951, citizens from the area filed 161 damage claims with the 
AEC office, with two of those coming from Washington County for structural damage.  The 
AEC claimed that, as with the claims following the first test series, around ten percent of 
residents citing damage to property from detonations had stated that they would not file claims.87  
It would seem that Washingtonians felt more connected with mainstream America as a result of 
their ability to make small sacrifices that contributed to a greater national cause, participate in 
national programs (like Civil Defense) in which they engaged to prevent such spread on the 
home front, and the common fear that they felt from the threat of global communism. 
Throughout the 1950s, the local office of Civil Defense was instrumental in maintaining 
this palpable sense of fear in the minds of Washington County citizens.  A late 1952 article in the 
WCN provided a good example:  it reported that the “FCDA [Civil Defense] declares that the 
average American city would have to bury 40,000 dead within two days after one atomic bomb 
dropped upon it.”88  Compounding the problem of this shocking disclosure, the article estimated 
that “70 per cent [sic] of any raiding force of planes probably will get past U.S. air defenses.”89  
By 1955, the Civil Defense office began running advertisements in the WCN asking for 
volunteers to operate Ground Observer Corps stations for two hours per week in order to provide 
advance notice of enemy planes encroaching upon U.S. airspace, thus enabling American fighter 
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jets to confront the attackers.90  Local civilians undoubtedly felt that this would be a selfless act 
which contributed to national security with the potential for saving thousands of lives. 
In October 1952, the Utah State director of civil defense held a course in St. George 
which spanned three days in order to educate the local population on “self-preservation” during 
an attack.  The stated goal was to prepare all American citizens for their respective roles in the 
event that a major U.S. city was hit by a Soviet weapon.91  It seems that citizens heeded the call 
for volunteering in Civil Defense programs, as numerous related articles throughout the 
remainder of the atmospheric testing period cited the willingness of Washingtonians to assist 
with various maneuvers.  Nora Lyman wrote of the importance of Civil Defense operations in 
her Observations column in September 1954.  This highly subjective account of the importance 
of the Civil Defense program claimed that participation could prevent “a hundred atomic Pearl 
Harbors;” would provide “training for those of us who live in the wide, open spaces to accept 
and care for the hordes who will flee in terror from the stricken city areas” after a nuclear strike; 
and would impart to citizens “the confidence to face whatever may come and the knowledge we 
need to protect ourselves.”  Furthermore, Lyman warned that “Without it, we may not survive an 
attack....  Why not prepare for the worst and hope for the best?”92  Echoing these sentiments, 
Marilyn Daniels, a Home Demonstration Agent for 4-H, claimed that Civil Defense programs 
were “a way of saving your life and property.”93  According to Washington County’s Civil 
Defense director in February 1958, the county was “well organized and prepared to act as a 
reception center for 30,000 people in case of attack.”94 
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When one compares Civil Defense press releases with those prepared by the Atomic 
Energy Commission, one cannot help but notice the change from negative language used to 
describe the potential effects of a Soviet weapon to the decidedly positive language used when 
referring to experiments with nuclear weapons at NTS.  From articles describing the death and 
destruction resulting from enemy attack to articles lauding the ways in which U.S. nuclear tests 
“contributed to the development and to the utilization of atomic weapons,” the degree to which 
the narrative shifts is telling.95  In articles describing bomb blasts, the AEC press releases 
included euphemistic phrases such as “the most powerful and brilliant,” “new and improved 
nuclear devices,” and “tremendous power and energy released by the atomic explosion dwarfed 
the sound and power of conventional shells.”96  Yet another article which reported the recent test 
of a nuclear device claimed that “Early rising Utahns in St. George and other sections of 
Washington County... were rewarded by the ruddy glow that signaled the blast.”97  The AEC also 
made sure always to declare that their experiments had not “resulted in any hazard to humans.”98  
However, the commission did warn that there existed the possibility that citizens could be 
harmed—from broken glass hurtling through the air after the shock wave from a blast passed 
through the area, potentially breaking windows.99  The overall effect then is that language used 
in reports of the AEC’s activities portrayed its nuclear devices as benign experiments compared 
to the malicious intent and destructive capabilities of Soviet weapons. 
Despite the use of such mild psychological manipulation, the AEC encountered problems 
in the public relations area from the outset of its experimental program.  This resulted from 
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stories told by local ranchers and mining speculators who owned Geiger counters.  Some local 
ranchers began reporting that “strange burns” were afflicting them and their horses and that 
unexplained ailments were killing their cattle and sheep.  Men who had been or were currently 
searching for large uranium deposits reported that “geiger [sic] counters... registered off the 
scale.”100  When local citizens expressed anxiety over these occurrences, the AEC was quick to 
dismiss such concerns, claiming that local laypersons lacked the scientific background to make 
such determinations.  AEC officials were also quick to release official statements refuting the 
occurrence of readings which indicated that radioactivity levels were unusually high.101  The 
AEC attempted to discredit the Geiger counter phenomena by pointing out that the devices were 
prone to malfunction and hyper-sensitivity.   
When Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE began at NTS in March 1953, the AEC was still 
formulating safety standards and emergency procedures; worse, the administrators chose to 
ignore certain facts and warnings that could have prevented future accidents, as delays to already 
scheduled programs would be costly.  During the series, which lasted from March 17 to June 4, 
1953, monitors did not operate “farther than 200 miles from the proving ground borders.”102  The 
rapidity with which observation personnel reached their maximum radiation exposure further 
contributed to the limited monitoring, and caused the AEC to increase the maximum “safe” 
level.103  Procedural precedents would have to be sacrificed in order to complete the operation 
successfully. 
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The level of public concern dramatically increased beginning in April 1953, the same 
time that the AEC began detonating higher-yield nuclear weapons at NTS.104  The Simon and 
Harry Shots went horribly wrong when their respective fallout clouds were carried swiftly away 
from ground zero.  A 43-KT explosion, fallout from Simon (detonated April 25) resulted in the 
Test Director ordering roadblocks to be erected offsite after the monitors discovered “several 
trucks, a Greyhound bus, [and] private cars,” which were contaminated to the east.105  Never 
before had the administrators had to order such offsite activities.  Although they did not find any 
locations where radiation levels were above 0.46 roentgens, safety teams inspected close to “400 
vehicles in all and sent 40 for washing,” and the AEC denied that there were any reports of 
significant ill health effects.106 
In St. George, local service station employees and proprietors reported washing 
“approximately 75 cars and trucks.”107  The AEC did not respond to WCN inquiries “as to 
whether the unprecedented check of cars and trucks indicated unusual concentrations of 
radioactive dust from Saturday morning’s blast had been blown down to the highway.”108    
Vehicles stopped for cleaning were travelling north on Highway 91 into Utah from Nevada.  
Cleaning operations appear to have been conducted throughout the day, as the article states that 
“One service station operator... said he had 14 cars waiting for washing at one time between 5 
and 6 p.m.”109  The concern the AEC officials expressed in cleaning the cars of radioactive 
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debris does not seem to have been extended to the service station employees attending to the 
contaminated vehicles.  There is no mention in the sources that these employees used any sort of 
special protection to prevent radioactive contamination to their bodies; neither is there a report 
that suggests they failed to employ preventative measures.   
The Greyhound bus in question had apparently been travelling south on Highway 91, as it 
was cleaned at a roadblock in North Las Vegas, according to the article.  The report of the 
contaminated Greyhound bus is significant in that it seems to have been a basic means of travel 
during this time period, as advertisements for Greyhound fares appeared regularly in the WCN 
from April 1951 through 1958, when advertisements for automobile dealerships dramatically 
increased.  It is likely that Washingtonians were aboard the bus, as there was a hub in St. George.  
What is perhaps more alarming, though, is that persons from across the U.S. with limited 
knowledge of the frequency and effects of NTS experiments were unknowingly contaminated 
with radioactive fallout, especially considering that these busses did not have an interior cooling 
system and the windows likely would have been down for the trip across the hot desert.  In 
customary fashion, however, the AEC office did declare “that persons, animals, or crops exposed 
to the material were in no danger.”110 
However, there is no evidence to suggest that the AEC monitor in St. George inspected 
the car wash.  Where did the radiation being scrubbed from the vehicles accumulate?  Did 
service station employees receive higher than normal radiation doses from their proximity to the 
radioactive dust?  Apparently, in their haste to reassure the populace that there was no danger, 
AEC officials ignored the very real dangers from radiation exposure in this and numerous other 
instances.  As before, the AEC did not abandon the operation or its schedule following these two 
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incidents.  It did, however, develop a new “‘Highway Rad Safe Plan,’… a formal plan to deal 
with any future crisis of the same nature,” which was released in mid-May.111 
Despite the scare, there were no comments on the effects of Shot Simon in the WCN until 
the second issue after this alarming incident.  Even then, it was assistant editor Nora Lyman 
remarking that “Atomic detonations are becoming so commonplace with us now that few of us in 
this area even raise an eyebrow” when an explosion was seen or felt.112  However, in the 
following issue, a front-page article appeared with the headline “Bomb Sears Nevada Area in 
Largest Atomic Test; St. George Opinions Vary.”  This article announced the previous week’s 
test, Shot Encore, and described the experiments the AEC and military conducted during the 
exercise.  It also stated that the AEC had disclosed that Encore was “the largest military and 
civilian effects nuclear test ever held in this country.”113  While the text of the article failed to 
clarify further the assertion that opinions in St. George varied, Nora Lyman addressed the 
concern in her weekly column.  She quoted Clarence N. Stover, research administrator of the 
radiobiological laboratory at the University of Utah, as stating that “the cloud... was traveling so 
high and so fast that there was little or no fallout.”114  Lyman suggested that  
the reason for so much agitation and excitement was that the wind was extremely high, and 
the thermometer kept jumping around without rime or reason.  We are accustomed, more or 
less, to an occasional dust fury early in spring, but the temperature is usually stable.  Friday, 
the combination of black clouds, threatening rain, cold, dust and an atom detonation resulted 
in all sorts of wild rumors.115 
 
It seems that residents had become a bit more concerned than previously about the effects the 
detonations were having on their community.   
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A few weeks after the Simon Shot, on May 19, a wind shift at the time of detonation sent 
the radioactive cloud from Shot Harry, a 32-KT device, moving over areas of Nevada and Utah.  
Despite the fact that test managers had determined that the weather was “‘perfectly satisfactory 
for this shot,’” fallout rained particularly hard on the communities of Cedar City, Utah, and St. 
George.116  The AEC’s Health and Safety Laboratory offsite personnel wasted no time 
implementing the formal offsite safety procedures.  However, since the yield of Harry was 
considerably less than Simon, administrators believed that the radiation levels would not surpass 
those which occurred during Simon.  When radiation readings in St. George reached 0.3 
roentgens per hour, the AEC again conducted its roadblock and free car-wash service along 
affected highways and warned the population of St. George to stay indoors from shortly after 9 
a.m. until noon.117   
According to reports of the incident, only residents within the St. George municipality 
were warned of the impending danger.  It seems that citizens of other parts of Washington 
County were oblivious to the radioactive threat.  Since the AEC still claimed publicly that 
radiation did not pose harmful effects in cumulative doses, but, rather, wore off after a short 
time, it continued to assert “that ‘radiation had not reached a hazardous level’” and even children 
in public schools “were allowed out by lunchtime.”118  The mishap was so dramatic that the AEC 
announced in August 1953 that it would begin “work on a documentary film record.... including 
efforts to keep St. George residents indoors” while the radioactive cloud passed over the area.119 
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Ironically, the WCN issue which followed this latest AEC miscalculation featured a letter 
to the editor from a University of Utah student and resident of St. George.  Ralph J. Hafen wrote 
that he had conducted “considerable research into the problem of radiation” and felt “morally 
obligated to warn people of the irreparable damage that may have occurred or may in the future 
occur.”120  Mr. Hafen claimed that scientific interpretation of available data had resulted “in 
sharp dispute” among members of the scientific community as to the possibility of 
“physiological injury” to humans from radiation exposure.121  Further asserting that “Your 
health, your children’s health and the health of generations yet unborn are at stake,” Hafen 
pointed out four problem areas which AEC officials had not addressed:  inhalation of fallout 
debris, effects of beta radiation (as opposed to gamma radiation), the amount of radiation 
contamination in areas outside the St. George area, and the potential for radiation to cause 
hereditary mutations.122 
Hafen concluded by stating that the AEC was “morally obligated to clear up [these 
issues] before continuing with their tests in Nevada.”123  Evidently, Mr. Hafen’s letter was not 
well received by the Health Division of the Utah State Civil Defense Administration, as it sent a 
letter to the editor which appeared two weeks later.  Without citing Mr. Hafen’s letter directly, 
the department claimed that “We feel that every citizen has the right to know the truth about this 
situation, and would like to avoid any undue anxiety which might have been caused by wild 
rumors.”124  It further stated that it had sent two physicians to the area to investigate, who had 
found “that it was highly improbable that any person could receive damage from the recent ‘fall-
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out.’”125  Then, in August, the AEC increased its public relations efforts when it sent two 
representatives to the St. George area in order “to discover the feelings of the public regarding 
the tests and to uncover possible misconceptions.”126 
Despite the two experimental debacles, the AEC continued with its final two scheduled 
detonations, and even detonated the largest device yet at NTS on June 6.  Shot Climax yielded 
61-KT, yet there are no reports in the WCN regarding fallout scares or damaged property in 
Washington County.  Still, the spring 1953 mishaps had taken their toll on the AEC’s public 
image, and the commission made the decision to relocate all 1954 experiments to its Bikini 
facility.  After more than a year away from the NTS, the AEC scheduled a new test series to 
begin in February 1955.  Before firing the first shot, however, a conference of AEC officials and 
health officials from Utah convened to discuss the myriad ways in which AEC test coordinators 
attempted to protect public health.  The measures included giving “great consideration... as to 
where the wind will carry the particles,” evaluating “water and milk samples... for the presence 
of radio activity in the area,” and posting personnel at both “fixed stations” and “mobile units... 
in all communities adjacent” to the testing grounds.127  Test directors fired the first shot of the 
new test series less than a week later on February 18. 
The inception of the new series sparked a new wave of concern among Washingtonians.  
St. George city officials attempted to calm the citizenry by reiterating the AEC’s public safety 
claims.  The WCN reported that “the mayor and city officers feel there is no danger, as the fall-
out is not great enough to cause danger.”128  Apparently, city officials had consulted AEC 
officials who had compared the amount of radiation received from fallout to the amount one 
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received from an X-ray, “so they felt there was no cause for worry.”129  Nora Lyman helped to 
perpetuate this explanation three weeks later in her weekly column, writing that “doctors and 
officials... say that radiation is about one-twentieth of that experienced in an X-ray.”130  Lyman 
went on to claim that readers who were concerned should feel thankful that they were not one 
“of the three men who left St. George in an airplane the day of the explosion and, inadvertently, 
flew right through the cloud.”131 
Despite the admonishments not to worry, fears continued, even if not in the public view.  
In October 1957, an article appeared which reported the highest fallout readings for St. George 
(0.5 roentgens), Veyo (0.63 roentgens), and Shivwits Indian Reservation (0.54 roentgens), all 
communities located in Washington County.  The article further claimed that the Utah State 
Department of Health had initiated “a study of the effects on Utah residents of fallout from the 
atomic bomb tests in Nevada,” and quoted Dr. Joseph P. Kesler of the Utah State Department as 
saying that “there is now... ‘a danger only in potential,’” and that “the present accumulation of 
radioactive materials resulting from the annual tests has probably not caused any injury.”132  The 
article concluded by claiming that some officials feared that “continued testing could possibly 
raise the radioactive level past the danger point.”133   
Still, a local observer claimed that during the period surrounding Shot Harry, “People in 
St. George... were relatively unconcerned.  The common reaction was that, if the United States 
tests were needed, then they had to be conducted.”134  Even after a fallout scare from large 
detonations in the Soviet Union in 1961, and despite resumed testing at NTS following a nearly 
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three year moratorium, “worry here [in St. George] is at a minimum.”135  An article appearing in 
the WCN just before Christmas 1961 responded to the newly raised concerns.  The article, 
“Don’t Worry About Fallout,” cited an interview with Dr. Ralph E. Jorgenson, the president of 
the Utah State Medical Association, in which he conceded that scientists were not fully in 
agreement with one another on the health effects of radioactive fallout.  He then asserted that 
“there isn’t very much that us average folks can do about it anyway....  If there is radioactive 
fallout in the air, we’ll get some of it, and there’s nothing we can do about it.”136  According to 
the doctor, “the best tonic for good health is to be happy, [so] let’s be happy this Christmas 
season.”137   
An advertisement taken out in the WCN in August 1963 by Lloyd E. Howard of La 
Verkin provides further evidence that concern had not turned to paralytic fear even more than a 
decade removed from the first NTS tests.  Mr. Howard admonished readers to “ACT NOW FOR 
FREEDOM” by writing Utah’s federal Senators and recommending that they vote against the 
proposed Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).138  Mr. Howard claimed that the LTBT would 
threaten U.S. national security and be “meaningless as a restraint on Soviet aggression,” and 
argued that the Soviets “used the last test ban moratorium to secretly prepare for nuclear 
testing.”139  Despite the passage of the LTBT by both countries and the USSR’s adherence to its 
stipulations, Washingtonians remained convinced that atmospheric nuclear detonations were a 
vital part of the nation’s security. 
It is clear that throughout the atmospheric weapons testing period, patriotism trumped 
anxiety over potential adverse health effects among Washington County’s population.  While 
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many citizens did openly express their apprehension at the fallout raining down upon their heads, 
town officials and newspaper editors made sure that they parroted the AEC declarations that 
radiation exposure had not resulted in any danger to the human population.  Furthermore, appeals 
to their status as average Americans, rather than viewed as condescension of their intellectual 
capabilities, likely caused this small Mormon community to feel more accepted by mainstream 
society.  It is also likely that it served to prevent many Washingtonians from conducting any 
independent research into the problem of nuclear radiation, although, even if they had committed 
to doing such research, the available, publicly accessible published sources would have only 
served to reinforce the AEC’s faulty assertions.  The phenomenon which both the AEC and the 
citizens of Washington County failed to recognize was the effect of radiation on the surrounding 
environment, both biological and geological. 
 52 
THE UNSEEN ENEMY:  FARMING PRACTICES, RADIATION, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
 
“The history of life on earth has been a history of interaction between living things and their 
surroundings.”—Rachel Carson140 
 
AEC scientists gave little thought or effort in the early years of atmospheric testing to 
studying the effects of fallout particles absorbed or ingested by flora and fauna in the paths of the 
radioactive clouds which passed over communities like Washington County.  As late as 1959, 
Dr. John N. Wolfe, the chief scientist of the Environmental Sciences Branch of the Division of 
Biology and Medicine at the AEC, testified before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
(JCAE) that “the major problems confronting man in atomic energy are ecological.  Fallout, 
whatever its intensity, needs study as to its distribution and redistribution by wind, water, ice, 
food chains, biotic migration, and abscised plant parts.  Disposal of radioactive by-products 
presents a continuing problem of an environmental nature....”141  The AEC was not, however, an 
agency which placed a premium on continuity.   
Five years after Wolfe’s testimony, Dr. Gordon M. Dunning, head of the Division of 
Biology and Medicine at the AEC, published a work in which he claimed that “fallout particles 
consisting of inert materials together with the associated radioactive materials settle to the earth’s 
surface where most of them remain and thus never get inside our bodies.”142  Dunning seemed to 
be assuming, counter to the previous suggestions made by one of his subordinates, that wind 
would not move the particles, human activities such as mining or farming would not disturb the 
particles, and that these particles would not land on animals or plants for human consumption.  It 
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proved to be an issue which received attention too late, however, as Washington County, known 
as Utah’s Dixie for its abundant variety of agricultural products, was above all else an 
agricultural community in the 1950s.   
An April 1959 article in the Washington County News cited “the long growing season, 
mild winters and favorable grazing conditions” of the region as the primary factors in making 
Washington County a prime area for agricultural industry.143  In June 1951, county agent Melvin 
S. Burningham reported that he had obtained the 1950 agricultural census records for Dixie’s 
farming industry.  As of 1949, there were 706 farms with 17,898 acres of irrigated land, and an 
additional 19,042 acres of pasture land; of the irrigated land, farmers devoted 7,000 acres to 
winter wheat, 6,000 acres to alfalfa, and 2,500 acres to barley production.144  By the time of the 
1954 agricultural count, the county’s agricultural production grossed nearly $800,000:  eighty-
three percent of this total came from the field crops of winter wheat, alfalfa, and barley; thirteen 
percent came from fruit crops; and the remaining four percent came from vegetable crops and 
“horticultural specialties.”145  In 1958, a series of storms wreaked havoc on area farms, dealing 
an estimated $100,000 in damages to crops previously listed, as well as cherry, apricot, quince, 
plum, and strawberry crops.146  Agricultural enterprises were so prevalent in the county that even 
in the 1950s and 1960s Washington County was hosting foreign exchange students through the 
international farm youth exchange program and agricultural delegates from foreign nations.147 
Another important aspect of Dixie’s agricultural industry was its livestock production, 
including cattle, sheep, and turkeys, as well as dairy and feed products associated with the 
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industry.  In 1950, ranchers had more than 20,000 cattle and 55,000 sheep grazing on the lands 
comprising the Dixie national forest, and the numbers stayed roughly the same for 1951 and 
1952.148  The 1954 agricultural census revealed that the total worth of livestock and livestock 
products exceeded $2.7 million, with $1.168 million in poultry, $1.120 million in cattle, and 
$422,840 in dairy products.149  By 1959, there were in excess of 30,000 cattle valued at more 
than $6 million in Washington County, and Barlocker Farms, Inc., a company based in the small 
community of Enterprise, sold more than one million turkeys annually.150 
Perhaps the single-most important agricultural enterprise in Washington County, relative 
to the atmospheric weapons testing period, was the dairy industry.  Many people in the area 
believed that milk was a critical part of healthy diets, and one local even proclaimed that “nature 
undoubtedly intended milk to be an excellent food, as it falls so little short of perfection.”151  
Many residents, especially in rural areas of the county, owned a backyard cow from which they 
derived their supplies of milk and butter.  According to a 1981 DOE publication that had 
surveyed residents from 1951-1962, “55 percent obtained milk from their own cow, 44 percent 
drank milk with every meal,” “22 percent fed their children fresh cow’s milk, 56 percent 
obtained their drinking water from a spring, and 65 percent grew leafy vegetables.”152  In most 
cases, these home-grown dairy products were unpasteurized, as evidenced by articles in the local 
newspaper promoting buying pasteurized milk and home pasteurization methods.153  Even by 
late 1959, an investigation was under way that had already “found that many people are still 
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selling raw milk without a permit.”154  In 1953, the Washington County Dairy Herd 
Improvement Association reported that the average output for association cows was 9,779 
pounds of milk and 386 pounds of butterfat per cow; this was more than 3,000 pounds of milk 
and 140 pounds of butterfat per cow above the state average for Utah.155  By 1956, Nora Lyman 
reported that, in the fourteen year existence of the Washington County Dairy Herd Association, 
the local industry had grown from supplying 100 gallons of milk per day to 3,300 gallons.156 
Dairy producers in Dixie supplied not only the local population with milk, butter, and 
cheese, but by the mid-1950s were also shipping a large portion of their unpasteurized dairy to 
distributors in Utah and Las Vegas.157  Hi-Land Dairy’s ad lauded itself as “Utah’s First and 
Finest Carton Milk,” while the Washington County Dairy Association was promoting Anderson 
Dairy Products out of Las Vegas because it processed the area’s unpasteurized dairy goods 
before returning them to Washington County as pasteurized milk, cheese and butter.158  
Furthermore, the ad claimed that “over one-half million dollars a year [are] sent into Washington 
County by Anderson.”159  The Washington County Dairy Association secured the contract with 
Anderson sometime in late 1952 or early 1953, and contracted with Anderson in October 1956 to 
have their own milk distributed within the county.160   
This was significant for Washingtonians because radioactive fallout from near-earth 
blasts carries high concentrations of short-lived radionuclides, including the radioactive isotope 
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of iodine (I-131), which, Dr. Dunning conceded, “will be deposited relatively quickly and can 
enter the food chain.”161  This entry comes primarily through the consumption of milk, and about 
thirty percent of the I-131 is then deposited in the thyroid gland regardless of organ size.  
According to Dunning, “an infant’s thyroid gland of about two grams weight would receive 10 
times more radiation dose than the 20 gram adult’s thyroid for the same amount of iodine 131 
ingested.”162  He went on to admit that “direct measurements of iodine 131 in milk were not 
made around the Nevada Test Site during earlier times of testing since it was the consensus of 
scientists within and outside the AEC and Government at that time that the limiting factor was 
the potential external whole body exposure.”163  In fact, the AEC did not measure ingested 
radioactive contaminants which had entered the food chain from 1951 through the completion of 
the 1958 test series.164   
The agency did, however, understand the dangers associated with exposure to radioactive 
I-131 prior to Shot Harry, as Frank Butrico, the AEC monitor stationed in St. George during the 
event, had orders to test the local milk for I-131.165  It is unclear whether Butrico was acting on 
his own volition or under orders when he chose to collect his sample from “several purchases 
from stores so as not to create alarm,” but his measurements could not have been accurate since 
he chose not to acquire samples from local sources as Washingtonians would have done.166  
According to the DOE report, Butrico had become “concerned that radioactivity might get into 
the milk supply from cows eating contaminated vegetation.”167  Later studies indicated that there 
                                                 
161
 Dunning, Health Aspects, p. 11. 
162
 Ibid., p. 11. 
163
 Ibid., p. 11. 
164
 Ball, Justice Downwind, p. 108. 
165
 Fradkin, Fallout, p. 21.  Butrico’s name only comes from Fradkin’s work, as far as I have been able to determine.  
His actions are mentioned in DOE documents, but his name is never given in them. 
166
 United States, Battlefield, p. 106; Fradkin, Fallout, p. 21. 
167
 United States, Battlefield, p. 106. 
 57 
was a significant potential for “thyroid abnormalities” in children as a result of ingesting milk 
which had been contaminated with I-131.168 
Dunning’s claims of scientific consensus were disingenuous, as the National Committee 
on Radiation Protection had come to the conclusion nearly twenty years earlier that the 
“tolerance dose” theory of radiation damage, which proposed that radiation exposure below a 
certain threshold was typically not dangerous, was incorrect.169  Following Polish physicist 
Marie Curie’s discovery of radium in 1898, physicians began using the element as a treatment 
for cancer patients, although some scientists soon warned that there were potentially serious 
health consequences which may result from exposure to radium.170  Despite the early warnings, 
radium was popularized as a medicinal supplement in the patented Radithor water manufactured 
by Bailey Radium Laboratories, and was also used in everyday products such as toothpaste and 
hair creams, as well as luminescent paints.  It was not until the 1920s that the effects of the 
radioactive element received proper attention in regard to its potential damage to the human 
body.   
Dr. Harrison Stanford Martland’s 1925 article in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association presented critical evidence that the practice of consuming radium was indeed 
harmful and potentially fatal.171  By 1932, the American Medical Association had disqualified 
radium from its index of substances “approved for internal administration.”172  From 1928 to 
1929, both the International X-Ray and Radium Protection Committee (1928) and the American 
X-Ray and Radium Protection Committee (1929) had established their safety dose guidelines on 
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admittedly deficient proof of the effects of radiation.  While neither committee declared “that its 
tolerance dose was definitive” and both conceded that injury may result from exposure to any 
amount of radiation, both “considered levels below the tolerance dose to be generally safe and 
unlikely to cause permanent damage to the ‘average individual.’”173   
In 1965, the U.S. Department of Agriculture published an article in Farmer’s Bulletin 
entitled “Defense against Radioactive Fallout on the Farm,” in which the government gave 
advice for protecting America’s farmlands from suffering catastrophic damage in the event of a 
foreign nuclear attack.174  It asserted that “early fallout consists of heavy particles that are 
deposited within 24 hours after a nuclear explosion and usually within a few hundred miles from 
the explosion.”175  Of the tests which resulted in radiation clouds dumping fallout in the 
Washington County area, wind pattern reports show that fallout from the clouds arrived between 
six and twelve hours from the time of detonation.176  This time frame meant that Washington 
County received fallout from the passing clouds during the period in which the heaviest and most 
radioactive particles fell back to earth from the force of the explosion.  However, there was no 
monitoring system in place for detecting long-range fallout at the first NTS test shot.  Only after 
fallout was detected at the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester, New York, did the AEC recognize 
the need for off-site fallout monitoring.  To that point, AEC scientists claimed to believe that 
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offsite monitoring was unwarranted and, therefore, had not implemented such a system to track 
radiation outside the boundaries of NTS.177 
In examining the question of the length of time radioactive fallout would contaminate 
agricultural lands, the USDA article indicated that the contamination period was dependent on 
the amount and kinds of radioactive debris in a specific location.178  The authors were very clear, 
however, in stating that “fallout can contaminate food, water, buildings, yards, and fields, and 
make them unsafe to use for varying periods of time.  Generally, food and water are not difficult 
to decontaminate, nor are buildings or paved areas.  Yards and fields may be very difficult.”179  
As well, the article asserted that “vegetables that are exposed to heavy fallout may become 
highly contaminated.  Leaves, pods, and fruits that retain fallout material should be cleaned 
before being eaten.  Washing is probably the most effective measure.”180  Unfortunately for those 
prepared farmers who had thoroughly studied this document, there was no precise description as 
to how water could be decontaminated, as food was to be washed with water to help 
decontaminate it.  Where in the desert environs of Washington County was uncontaminated 
water to be obtained when the entire county had been irradiated by nuclear fallout?   
Furthermore, the revelation that whole fields and pastures could be irreparably 
contaminated was a real threat, since the result of farm animals consuming polluted food 
necessarily meant they would ingest and absorb some amounts of radiation.  When farmers 
slaughtered these animals for food, radioactive elements would have contaminated the local food 
supply.181  Despite these revelations, the federal government continued to deny through the 
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1980s that sheep ranchers and farmers in southwestern Utah had been exposed to excessive 
amounts of radiation during the early years of NTS testing activities.  The article went on to state 
that “radioactive iodine is secreted in the milk of cattle; it thus is a particular threat to young 
children drinking milk from cows grazing on contaminated pasture during the first few weeks 
following a nuclear attack.”182  The fact that a government agency unaffiliated with the AEC 
disseminated this information so soon after the abolition of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing 
in 1963 leads to devastating questions regarding how the science related to the hazards of 
radiation contamination of food and water supplies had developed so rapidly in less than two 
years.  Despite the AEC’s assertions that it would in no way continue with operations at its 
continental test site if a legitimate threat from radioactive fallout existed, the scientific evidence 
which directly refuted AEC reassurances had existed for many years, and was only publicly 
acknowledged in the context of the potential destructive capabilities of Soviet weapons and 
following the conclusion of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. 
Again, however, the brief history of atomic experimentation prior to the 1951 continental 
testing program proves that the AEC was terribly short-sighted in light of ongoing scientific 
observation.  Three years following the July 1946 detonation of the Baker device on the 
southeast cape of Bikini Atoll, the AEC and the University of Washington’s Applied Fisheries 
Laboratory jointly produced a report which determined that their three years of exhaustive 
research had not yielded conclusive solutions to the continuing problem of radiation in local food 
sources.  The report concluded that radioactive elements persisted in both native plants and 
animals, even though the military had detonated the weapon more than ninety feet underwater.183  
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The national press sensationalized the story, with such titles as the Washington Post’s article, 
“It’s Safe to Live on Bikini But Not Eat Its Products.”  However, the articles explicitly stated 
that “scientists still can’t say when—or whether—the natives will be able to return to the Pacific 
atoll” which was formerly their homeland.184  That these articles appeared in major national 
newspapers “a day after President Truman’s announcement that the Soviet Union apparently had 
developed an atomic weapon of its own” provides grim evidence that officials involved in 
locating a continental testing site would not permit data gathered through objective scientific 
observation to deter plans for the facility or the furthering of U.S. nuclear ambitions.185   
From the perspective of thirty-three years post-Trinity, twenty-seven years following the 
first detonation at NTS, and twenty-six years following the first detonation of a thermonuclear 
weapon, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could reasonably claim that 
the Trinity explosion “had a nominal explosive yield of 20 kilotons.”186  A 1978 EPA report 
showed that the fallout cloud from the Trinity explosion moved northeast from the detonation 
site in conjunction with the prevailing winds.  By examining “the intensity of beta-gamma 
radiation from fission product deposition,” officials had estimated the distribution of ground-
level radioactive fallout within a few weeks of the experiment.187  Even thirty-three years after 
the Trinity test, “the highways and major unpaved roads” surrounding, but outside the 
boundaries of the White Sands Missile Range, held “detectable amounts of Trinity plutonium in 
                                                                                                                                                             
was set off in the water.”  Mikhailov provided the depth measurement of 27.5 meters; I utilized an internet 
conversion calculator and the measurement of 27.5 meters below the surface to reach a calculation of 90.22 feet, a 
calculation supported by Jonathan Weisgall, Operation Crossroads:  The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll, Annapolis, 
MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1994, p. 207.  Two likely explanations for the mistake are that the force of the 
detonation created an underwater crater, or that the bomb was not resting on the ocean floor at the time of 
detonation. 
184
 WP, “It’s Safe to Live on Bikini But Not Eat Its Products,” September 25, 1949, p. 4; NYT, “Bikini Atoll Food 
Still Radioactive,” September 25, 1949, L4.   
185
 NYT, “Bikini Atoll Food Still Radioactive,” September 25, 1949, L4. 
186
 United States, Environmental Protection Agency, Levels and Distribution of Environmental Plutonium Around 
the Trinity Site, Las Vegas:  Office of Radiation Programs, 1978, p. 1.  Hereafter cited as EPA, Trinity. 
187
 Ibid., p. 1. 
 62 
the surface 5 centimeters of soil.”188  Although the Trinity Site is far to the east-southeast of 
Washington County, a 1983 study by a group of University of California—Los Angeles 
scientists revealed that Cesium-137 (Cs-137) had remained in the local topsoil between “5-7 
centimeters because of the arid climate and was easily absorbed into local vegetation and 
thereafter passed to the animal population.”189  These reports demonstrate that officials knew, at 
the latest within a few months of the Trinity detonation, that radioactive fallout from a western 
desert testing site had the potential to blow to the northeast and outside the boundaries of the 
established testing grounds.  Yet, AEC officials chose to ignore the data which could have 
prevented unnecessary contamination of population centers.   
The elevation at which a nuclear weapon explodes is a significant factor in the amount 
and size of fallout particles which are then deposited locally and regionally.190  As a result, the 
types of experiments conducted at NTS had a significant impact on the region surrounding the 
test site.  When nuclear detonations occur close to ground level, the explosive power lifts a huge 
amount of macerated soil into the mushroom cloud and transports it around 15 miles into the 
atmosphere.191  Weapons detonated near the earth’s surface produce radioactive fallout which 
falls back to the ground relatively quickly, dropping around half of the material created within a 
few hundred miles of the detonation.  Of the NTS atmospheric tests from 1951-1963 which 
produced more than one kiloton of explosive force, only three occurred above 1,000 feet; thirteen 
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detonations occurred within 100 feet of ground level, and an additional fifty-five occurred 
between 100 feet and 500 feet.192  Therefore, NTS tests predominantly produced fallout which 
returned to the earth’s surface over a very short distance and period of time. 
Testifying before the JCAE in 1959, Dr. John Wolfe stated that 
Radiation has become an intensified factor in the environment of man and the living things 
upon which he is dependent for food and shelter.  The ecological effects of this increase are 
not known.  Nor can they be determined by experiment alone, nor by considering only a 
single source of increased radiation such as fallout.  Determination of the total impact of this 
factor on man’s biotic environment and the evolution of living organisms therein, is a 
continuing problem.193 
 
For residents living in the downwind area of Washington County, gamma radiation to the entire 
body from “short-lived radionuclides” represented the most serious immediate danger of fallout 
exposure.194  The unpredictable nature of fallout meant that residents in rural locales were at 
higher risk of being exposed “to high doses from short-lived radionuclides and... pockets of 
intense long-lived radioactivity as well.  The highly localized nature of hot spots and their remote 
location make it unlikely that they would be found without immense efforts and perhaps not even 
then.”195  The AEC certainly did not exert “immense efforts” to measure radioactive hot spots 
when deciding to limit their off-site monitoring program to roadways.  Gordon Dunning even 
admitted that scientists understood that ingestion of fallout particles could cause health 
complications but stopped short of saying the AEC had failed downwind residents through 
limited monitoring practices which did not include pasture land or household gardens in 
Washington County.196  The AEC completely neglected their responsibilities regarding public 
safety in this respect since, by the conclusion of the 1958 test series, the agency was not 
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monitoring the degree to which downwinders were ingesting radioactive particles which filtered 
through the food chain.197 
The AEC, and Dunning in particular, often pointed to the size and frequency of Soviet 
weapons tests as the major contributing factor of above-average radiation levels while 
maintaining that U.S. weapons tests had a negligible effect on American citizens.  However, in 
testimony before the JCAE, J. E. Campbell stated that general studies of radioactive 
contamination of the nation’s milk supply showed that “concentrations of iodine-131, barium-
140, and strontium-89 varied widely, the higher levels being associated with the number of 
nuclear weapons tests per month in the United States, while tests conducted elsewhere in the 
world had a noticeable but lesser effect on the values observed.”198  How much higher were the 
concentrations of radioactivity in Washington County’s milk supply during NTS tests?  The data 
is lost to history as a result of the AEC placing a higher premium on public perception of its 
activities than on the safety of Washingtonians. 
There is no question that Washington County’s cows were particularly susceptible to 
radiation contamination and thus to pass along I-131 to those people who drank milk from 
contaminated cows.  I-131 was the most pervasive radionuclide in terms of ingestion exposure, 
as “ninety of the atmospheric tests at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) deposited high levels of I-131 
(5.5 hexabequerels) across a large portion of the contiguous United States, especially in the years 
1952, 1953, 1955, and 1957.”199  Washington County’s proximity to the NTS meant that high 
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levels of radioactive particles contaminated pastures in agricultural and ranching areas.200  
According to a 1999 National Research Council study, I-131 contaminates cows’ milk when the 
animal ingests grasses from contaminated land.  Whereas scientists recorded measurements for 
total fallout deposition, “few measurements of I-131 or total beta decay in cows’ milk or in 
pasture were made during the testing.”201  The report also stated that a given animal’s secretion 
rate of I-131 into its milk could range from one to twenty percent of the amount ingested, and 
that this rate is not constant, but fluctuates from animal to animal, as well as “in the same animal 
at different times.”202  Furthermore, it suggested that it is “probable” that milk from backyard 
cows would be produced at a lower rate and contain higher concentrations of I-131.203 
Utah’s federal representatives and senators were acutely aware of the concern of their 
citizens with regard to the weapons tests at NTS, particularly as they related to the effect of 
radioactive fallout on milk consumption.  However, this awareness does not seem to be present 
until the early 1960s, after the conclusion of the vast majority of atmospheric tests at NTS.  
When tests resumed in 1961, citizens became more vociferous in questioning the AEC’s 
methods.  In July 1962, John and Mary Cary wrote Utah’s U.S. Senator Frank Edward Moss 
(elected 1958) asking, “Why can’t this be done out in the Pacific?  When Russia made nuclear 
tests last winter there were many public reports of increased fallout in the United States.  Now 
this debris is being blown in the air right out in Nevada and we don’t hear a thing on the 
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increased radiation hazard.  Who’s kidding who?”204  Moss’s reply to them is telling, in that he 
admitted he was ignorant of the technical details of radiation effects and would instead refer their 
letter to AEC Chairman Dr. Glenn Theodore Seaborg for an answer.205  Moss did try to reassure 
the Carys that they were in no danger, and imparted to them his “understanding that special 
precautions had been taken to help control the fallout in the United States.”206 
The issue of contaminated milk seems to have gained much public attention by the 
summer of 1962.  Two weeks after Moss’ reply to the Carys, Henry Harwood of Spanish Fork, 
Utah, wrote to Senator Moss with concerns about the economic impact that resumed testing and 
increased exposure would have on the dairy industry.  Harwood wrote 
I suppose you realize what the recent dispute over milk is going to do to the consumption.  
This along with new roads cutting [… unintelligible] in half is rather hard to swallow.  I am 
certainly for our country and preparedness, but things must be considered.  Damages should 
be paid to those who are damaged.  It would appear to me that if we loose [sic] any market 
someone owes us some money.  You remember the Geneva Steel Payments to the stockmen 
and farming!  I see very little difference.  Off [sic] course there is a chance things may not 
be to [sic] bad, and come out all right.  It seems there is some place they could shoot those 
bombs off some place where they would cause less trouble.  Those selling other drinks bring 
much of this publicity and can’t Washington do something to see the dairy people through 
this thing?207 
 
By Spring 1963, the outcry reached near-hysteria, as both Moss and W. H. Bennett, 
Director of the Extension Services at Utah State University, began lobbying Seaborg to delay the 
scheduled series of tests “during this grazing season so as to protect the milk users.”208  Wynne 
Thorne, the Director of Utah State University’s Agricultural Experiment Station, also wrote to 
Senator Moss, claiming that “Iodine 131 has only an 8-day half-life and is, therefore, of primary 
importance as a contaminant in market milk.  Deferring testing to the winter months would in no 
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way reduce the value of the data obtained [from testing].  I can see no valid objection to such a 
course of action.”209 
Seaborg responded to these requests with typical AEC dismissive condescension.  More 
than one month after Moss’s letter to him, Seaborg replied by minimizing concerns regarding    
I-131 contamination of milk supplies.  He continued by pointing out the lengths to which the 
AEC had gone in order to ensure public safety: 
To keep atmospheric radioactive contamination as low as possible, nuclear testing at Nevada 
has been primarily conducted underground.  The detonation time is carefully selected with 
respect to the weather as an additional safeguard should any radioactivity reach the 
atmosphere.  Extensive computation and prediction techniques are undertaken to minimize 
the probability of any specific locality receiving repeated fallout.210 
 
Nearly three months later, Seaborg categorically rejected the possibility of restricting testing to 
winter months in order to eliminate the threat of I-131 in milk, since doing so “could place 
unacceptable restrictions on the conduct of important tests.”211  His attitude, coupled with the 
numerous fallout incidents and miscalculations it had committed, demonstrated that the AEC 
was far more dedicated to furthering nuclear weapons capabilities than to ensuring the safety of 
American citizens, despite its mandate to perform both duties with equal alacrity. 
 The self-sufficiency of Washington County residents in relation to their food sources 
meant that they were at much higher risk of harmful exposure to I-131.  The AEC’s average 
exposure estimates and selective monitoring practices do not take into account Washington 
County’s residents, since, on an individual basis, “exposure depends on such critical factors as 
varying individual consumption of milk and other foods and variations in the source of those 
foods.”212  In fact, because there were significant numbers of young children in the community 
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and most of this population drank milk from backyard cows and goats, Washington County’s 
residents must have received considerable doses of I-131.213  The evidence to establish this fact, 
however, does not exist because the AEC did not monitor contamination of food or milk until 
1958, after scientists published irrefutable evidence that, of the radionuclides created in a nuclear 
explosion, exposure to I-131 presented the most significant danger to human health.214  A Los 
Alamos Scientific Laboratories study from 1950 affirmed that “there appears to be no feasible 
means for salvaging unprotected food, either in the home, the store or in the fields, which has 
become radioactively contaminated,” despite previous assertions from the AEC that thorough 
washing of contaminated vegetables could cleanse them of health risks.215 
I-131 is the most significant radionuclide relating to Washington County’s experiences 
during nuclear weapons testing because scientists definitively discovered following the 1986 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster that I-131 has the potential to produce thyroid cancer.216  
By no means, however, was it the only radionuclide which presented significant problems for 
Washington County residents.  Atmospheric nuclear weapons experiments also produced the 
radioactive isotopes strontium-90 (half-life 28.8 years) and cesium-137 (half-life 30 years) and 
spread them globally, although nearby downwind populations were at highest risk of hazardous 
contamination.  Along with plutonium-239, these long-lived radioactive isotopes “constitute 
pervasive pollutants in our food and water” even to the present day.217   
Gordon Dunning reported in 1964 that “about 20 million curies of strontium 90 have 
been created by atmospheric nuclear tests with about 17 million curies of this being spread 
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globally.  The other 3 million curies fell quickly in areas local to the testing sites.”218  The 1965 
Farmer’s Bulletin warned that “strontium-90 falls on the surface of plants and can be consumed 
with foods and forage.  Some of it is deposited directly on the soil or washed into it, remaining 
indefinitely—for all practical purposes—in the top several inches of uncultivated land.”219  In the 
same publication, under the heading “Would fallout permanently affect pasture grass and forage 
crops?” the article claimed that heavy accumulation of fallout could produce “external radiation 
[which] would prohibit use of the pasture.”220   
Whereas strontium-90 is chemically similar to calcium and tends to accumulate in the 
bones, cesium-137 (Ce-137), while comprising only “about 0.05 percent” of total fallout yield 
from each test, distributes itself primarily throughout the soft tissues of the human body at a 
generally uniform rate.221  This particular isotope of cesium “only exists in a manmade state 
either as a by-product of a nuclear explosion, or as a radionuclide produced in a nuclear 
reactor.”222  Blair Bentley, a student at Oregon State University and native of Washington 
County, conducted a 2008 study which examined the Ce-137 levels in southwestern Utah.  With 
eighty-five soil samples taken from Washington County, Bentley found that the average 
Washington County reading was 380.7 becquerels per square meter and concluded that the 
region is still contaminated with radioactive cesium, since “nearly 4 times the measured amount 
today, existed in the soil shortly after the [atmospheric] testing was complete.”223  Based on this 
study, Bentley proved that AEC estimates of fallout deposition in the county were far too low. 
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Ingested and inhaled alpha and beta particles are less penetrating than gamma particles, 
and are most harmful when the body assimilates them, thus injuring the organs and cells near the 
point at which they settle.224  While ingestion of contaminated food and water was a problem for 
the entire downwind population, farmers, schoolchildren, and anyone outdoors as fallout clouds 
passed, were at especially high risk of receiving high doses of radiation from both short- and 
long-lived radionuclides.225  This was a serious problem for St. George, since it received “the 
highest concentration of radioactive debris in the air in a populated area off-site” during the 
atmospheric testing period.226  Dunning estimated this concentration “was about 1.3 millionth of 
a curie per cubic meter averaged over the 24 hours the activity was present.”227 
This was particularly pertinent to Washington County, since the Washington County 
News reported that St. George’s Dixie College experienced “heavy registration for Dixie’s famed 
outdoor classes” and had promoted itself as an ideal venue for outdoor courses and activities in 
March 1953.228  Two weeks later, an editorial by PTA member Montrue Larkin implored St. 
George residents to donate “$1 per family” to help address the “dust and dirt problem” of local 
schools to plant a lawn in order to prevent schoolchildren who would “come home at the end of a 
school day, grimy with dust and dirt” from returning home so dirty.229  As fertile as Washington 
County is, it is still arid desert land in most places and is comprised of a great deal of dirt and 
subject to desert dust storms.  By spring 1955, residents like Nora Lyman began speculating that 
there was a link between the nuclear tests at NTS and “dust storms such as we have never 
experienced in this country....  I believe that the A-Bomb detonations have been responsible to a 
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large degree.  The AEC admit, I am told, that these shots do cause wind, but not rain.”230  In 
August, Lyman again reported “freak storms and floods” in the area, stating, “Personally, I am 
wondering what effect, if any, the 42 atomic bombs, shot off on Yucca Flat this spring, had upon 
the wind and weather.”231  Regardless of whether the experiments were creating dust storms, 
local residents, and especially children, were no doubt directly affected, since “children playing 
outdoors, and therefore possibly breathing heavily, would have been especially at risk of high 
inhalation doses.”232  The Overview of the Department of Energy’s Off-Site Radiation Exposure 
Project (ORERP) of 1990 found that internal exposures from inhaled and ingested radionuclides 
“were comparable in magnitude to whole-body doses resulting from external γ [gamma] 
exposure.”233 
The composition of the earth’s surface is a major factor in determining contamination 
levels from fallout.  Rocky hillsides are generally more heavily contaminated than sandy valleys 
because there is a slower absorption of particulate debris; fallout settling in these areas tends to 
remain until rainfall washes it into lower-lying areas.234  Valleys comprised of loose soil tend to 
absorb fallout particles more quickly, where it is then taken into the roots of any present 
vegetation.  During the summer months, when the AEC conducted most of the NTS tests, the 
southwestern corner of Utah experiences a wet monsoon which generally results in daily 
afternoon thunderstorms.235  These storms tend to produce rainfall which passes quickly over the 
surface of the soil, providing water to “shallow-rooted species” of plants.  Thus, gardens and 
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cultivated farmland would have had radioactive particles seep more quickly into the soil from 
which the flora derived water and nutrients.236  Any fallout debris remaining at the surface level 
when the gentle winter rains began would be washed from hillsides and accumulate in low-lying 
valleys and farmlands. 
Despite the calamity and suffering inflicted upon all downwind populations during the 
testing years, AEC administrators continued to deny their negligent roles for decades.  Contrary 
to overwhelming evidence of environmental degradation and human injury, the AEC publicly 
maintained the pretense that its scientists were helping to better the world for American citizens.  
In a September 1967 response to Margaret Marr Lambert’s letter of August 21, 1967, John A. 
Harris, the Director of the AEC’s Division of Public Information, refuted Lambert’s assertion 
that the “atomic energy program... may be exploited for ‘political and selfish commercial 
reasons.’”237  Rather, he stated  
I would like to assure you that this is not the case, just as it is not true that the atomic energy 
program is being conducted at the expense of the general public’s health and safety or at the 
risk of polluting or contaminating the environment in which we live....  It is quite true that 
we don’t know all of the facts about radiation and its effects, nor do we understand all that 
we do know.238 
 
Harris pointed out that in twenty-five years of nuclear experiments knowledge had increased “to 
the point where the use of atomic energy is very much a part of our daily lives....  I hope that I 
have been able, to some degree, to overcome the concern expressed in your letter and to assure 
you that the Atomic Energy Commission is conducting all of its activities in a manner that is 
both safe and cognizant of the welfare and interests of the American people.”239  There is no 
record of Lambert’s response, whether these further reassurances from the AEC propaganda 
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machine were enough to assuage her fears completely.  It is clear, however, that the 
commission’s activities were detrimental to the natural environment to a degree which it was 
unwilling to examine closely, and the political apparatus which purported to protect life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness for Americans failed to reign in the AEC’s experiments. 
 74 
POLITICAL FALLOUT:  THE DOWNWINDERS, AEC DUPLICITY, AND 
CONGRESSIONAL FAILURE 
 
“Clever people may learn as much as they wish of the results of science—still one will always 
notice in their conversation, and especially in their hypotheses, that they lack the scientific 
spirit....  To have an opinion means for them to fantacize [sic] for it and thenceforth to press it in 
to their hearts as a conviction.  If something is unexplained, they grow hot over the first notion 
that comes into their heads and looks like an explanation—which results progressively in the 
worst consequences, especially in the sphere of politics.”—Friedrich Nietzsche240 
 
“Downwinders,” as the residents of communities impacted by fallout clouds from NTS 
experiments have come to be known, pleaded with politicians at all levels of government for 
relief from the injury raining down upon them from passing radiation clouds.  By the time the 
military had established NTS in 1951, the medical and military communities had more than half 
a century of experience with the effects of radiation on both civilians and soldiers.  However, a 
sociopathic culture developed alongside the promise of ever-greater applications of nuclear 
fission and fusion technologies, and this permeated the attitudes of AEC personnel during the 
atmospheric testing years.  The commission’s declarations of the importance of public safety in 
their experiments became no more than lip-service paid to (initially) unsuspecting people with 
revelations that the monitoring system which it eventually employed was an utter failure.  The 
AEC employed numerous propaganda campaigns, which began innocuously enough, in an effort 
to combat hysteria and conspiracy theories, but the deceptive measures which the commission 
developed ultimately reached astounding proportions with the support of respected congressional 
representatives and scientific and medical professionals who had access to the facts supporting 
the corrupted industry. 
Scientists and medical professionals did not immediately understand the harmful effects 
of nuclear radiation on the human body.  After W. C. Roentgen’s discovery of x-rays in 1895, 
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scientists began to associate radiation exposure with “burned skin, hair loss, and impaired 
vision;”241 it was not until 1929 that “the American Medical Association passed a resolution 
condemning the use of x-rays to remove body hair.”242  Marie Curie, who discovered radium in 
1898, died in 1934 of leukemia caused by exposure to radium throughout her professional 
career.243  While it was unknown at that time that a direct link existed between radium exposure 
and cancer, harmful health effects as a result of exposure were well known.  In addition to the 
aforementioned work of Harrison Martland and the highly publicized death of radium promoter 
Eben Byers, the case of the “Radium Girls” was well known to the scientific and medical 
communities.  These were female factory workers who labored as dial-painters in watch 
factories, using paint containing radium which caused the watch faces to glow in darkness.  
During the painting process, they ingested small amounts of radium which eventually led to 
illness and death.  Martland’s 1925 article established the scientific basis for ending the practice, 
but corporations using radium-based paints concealed evidence of radium poisoning and hired a 
group of “scientific consultants” who disagreed with Martland’s findings and placed the blame 
for the factory workers’ illnesses on other causes.244  Their cases ultimately led the American 
Medical Association to remove radium from a “list of remedies approved for internal 
administration” in 1932.245 
Government officials were responsible for perpetrating the most insidious of the radiation 
experiments on its own citizens.  Following the Trinity Shot in July 1945, Manhattan Project 
(and later AEC) scientists began conducting experiments on patients at hospitals for the mentally 
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ill.  With the discovery of plutonium and its relative importance to nuclear explosions, scientists 
began experiments to discover how much of the element was absorbed into the body, since they 
did not fully understand many aspects of its associated dangers.  These researchers administered 
plutonium injections to eighteen patients from four hospitals from 1945-1947, only one of whom 
signed a consent form.  This was part of an exercise in helping “to calibrate body burdens,” and 
the research team did not anticipate the treatments to yield any medical advantages for the 
patients and intentionally conspired to ensure recipients did not discover the nature of the 
experiments.246  Worst of all, the AEC “sponsored” several series of experiments on children at 
the Walter E. Fernald State School in Waltham, Massachusetts, which served young boys with 
developmental and mental disabilities.  In 1946, and again from 1950-1953, scientists 
administered radioactive tracers to the students, misleading parents into believing that the 
injections had the potential to be medically beneficial, even though “the experiments were not 
designed or expected to provide any health benefits to the subjects.”247 
The Manhattan Project was not spared from exposure accidents during its development of 
the bomb, though they seem to have been more incidental than deliberate in nature.  Project 
coordinators established exposure limits for employees based on the doses which the Advisory 
Committee on X-Ray and Radium Protection had established, although they actively encouraged 
workers to avoid any degree of irradiation.248  These dose restrictions also formed the guidelines 
for exposure limits used by the AEC upon its formation and takeover of nuclear experiment 
operations.  Following the Trinity Shot, researchers discovered “a radioactive ‘hot spot’... about 
twenty-five miles from ground zero.  This ‘hot spot’ was an area of high ground-level 
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radioactivity completely surrounded by areas of much lower activity.”249  Less than one year 
later, during a demonstration of a nuclear chain reaction at LASL, test director Alvin C. Graves 
and seven other men received a high dose of acute radiation when the experiment went awry.  
Dr. Louis Alexander Slotin, the scientist conducting the experiment, died nine days later, while 
the other men and Graves “received a whole-body dose of nearly 400 roentgens” although they 
received assurances from LASL director Norris E. Bradbury that it had been half that amount.250  
This was not the only incident, and the subsequent scholarly articles detailing the incidents and 
the effects of ionizing radiation on humans was well-documented and widely disseminated 
throughout AEC ranks.251  Deceit with regard to actual dose incurred from AEC accidents was 
not limited to those individuals who volitionally accepted the inherent risks associated with the 
assignment. 
The U.S. Advisory Committee on X-Ray and Radium Protection, founded in 1929, 
reorganized in 1946 and took the name National Committee on Radiation Protection (NCRP).  
Not long afterward, the committee made the decision to discard the term “tolerance dose” when 
referring to the amount of radiation exposure considered to be harmful.  Geneticists had shown 
that any amount of radiation could adversely affect human reproductive cells and that mutant 
genes which developed in a parent could be passed to offspring even if the parent had no 
indication of having suffered “obvious radiation-induced injuries.”252  The NCRP adopted the 
new term “maximum permissible dose” in order to acknowledge the concept that there was no 
level of safe exposure to radioactive material.  The new concept made unequivocal the 
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committee’s belief that there was always some potential of experiencing injury from radiation 
exposure below the allowable value.253 
Within two months of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings of August 1945, American 
and Japanese doctors were collaborating on the Joint Commission for the Investigation of the 
Atomic Bomb in Japan in order to study the human health effects of the bombs.  According to 
Dr. James Nobuo Yamazaki, the U. S. government maintained the position that there were no or 
“minimal” health effects resulting from radiation exposure, even though there were reports from 
Australian and American reporters to the contrary.254  Yamazaki asserted that “the foremost 
scientific concern at that time was the genetic effect... and that was the initial and primary 
motivation to take a long-term study.”255  There was also a specific effort to study the effects on 
children.  Yamazaki maintained that “at first the focus was what was happening to a young child; 
they knew that radiation had a stunting effect so they said to study how it’ll affect the growth and 
development of a child....  Then it became obvious that the biochemical reactions of radiation 
was [sic] indeed a toxic reaction.”256 
The U. S. military still controlled the atomic weapons testing program when Operation 
CROSSROADS commenced in June 1946 at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands.  Only two 
shots occurred that summer, but they were potent enough to require the evacuation of inhabitants 
of the islands.  Yamazaki recounted that “all of the children under 10 [years of age] developed 
some thyroid abnormalities, almost 100 percent.  And the ones that developed the most serious 
injury were those who were the youngest, say one years old, enough to... almost destroy the 
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thyroid.”257  According to Yamazaki, scientists also discovered “thyroid abnormalities, and... 
a[n] increased incidence of cancer of the thyroid” in adult Marshallese.258 
By October 1946, understanding had advanced to the point that Colonel Stafford Warren, 
the military officer heading radiological safety at Bikini that summer, gave a lecture to 
radiological safety personnel regarding the dangers associated with their assignment.  Col. 
Warren warned that 
you need only to absorb a few micrograms... to develop a progressive anemia or a tumor in 
from 5 to 15 years.  This is an insidious hazard and an insidious lethal effect hard to guard 
against....  [Radioactive fallout would be] all around you,... you couldn’t eliminate it and it 
would get on your clothes, in your house, in the water, in the milk, and all the food.  It 
would be in the dust and in the air you breathe.  Filters couldn’t keep it out....  You get it on 
your hands, you transfer it to your bread and jam, and you ingest it.  You pile up the 
amount—although it is not readily absorbed you gradually pile up increasing amounts.259 
 
Two days later, Col. Warren sent a memorandum to Gen. Groves in which he was unequivocal in 
his assertion that exposure to the smallest amount of radiation could have devastating health 
effects years later.  He claimed that a radioactive fragment from a bomb casing is 
probably the most toxic metal known, and... extremely small amounts deposited in the 
marrow will eventually cause progressive anemia and death years later.  Tumor formation 
has a high incidence....  [The material] mixed with these fission products, beta and gamma 
emitters, is an insidious hazard—not immediately dangerous but if absorbed into the body it 
produces a long time hazard....  The amount necessary to cause this hazard is minute—
measured in millionths of a gram.  The harmful effects occur years later....  I believe a frank 
statement of this sort should be made now to professional and intelligent lay groups as part 
of the general discussion on the effect of the bomb as a whole.260 
 
AEC officials, who had taken over nuclear weapons testing programs in August 1946, certainly 
had access to this information and purposely withheld the facts from the general public, 
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preferring instead to liken exposure to fallout with medical x-rays.261  Furthermore, eight years 
later, Dunning claimed that there were not sufficient “vital statistics” or contaminated individuals 
following an exposure from a March 1954 Marshall Islands shot to determine whether there 
would be a “greater incidence of miscarriages and stillbirths” or stunted “growth and 
development of the children.”262 
This attitude pervaded the AEC throughout the atmospheric testing period.  AEC officials 
consistently adhered to their own cultural norm that what the public did not know could not 
prevent the commission from carrying on with the development of more advanced and 
destructive weapons.  In fact, they believed that ignoring concerns or deceiving those who may 
object was the only way to ensure continued funding for their experiments.  They were definitely 
knowledgeable of injuries associated with the historical abuses of x-rays and radium.263  The 
AEC, being an association of extremely ambitious and authoritative military, scientific, and 
industrial workers with their own distinctive mores, maintained an air of intellectual and 
technologically-minded superiority.  This led to an internal culture which fostered secrecy, 
individual isolation, and institutional obedience; overconfidence in industrial technology and 
alienation from human frailty; and ritualized participation in unleashing vast power while 
performing the roles of demigods in a blossoming scientific field.264  As a result, the AEC, as 
well as the laboratories and industries associated with its experiments, veiled their activities and 
the human costs associated with them from both the American public and government 
representatives in an effort to avert any restrictions which may be placed on their activities.265 
                                                 
261
 Ball, Justice Downwind, p. 204. 
262
 Dunning, Health Aspects, p. 6. 
263
 Walker, Permissible Dose, pp. 14-15. 
264
 Grahlfs, Voices from Ground Zero, p. 4. 
265
 Ibid., p. 42. 
 81 
Meanwhile, studies continued to emanate from non-AEC affiliated sources warning of 
the potential dangers associated with radiation exposure.  A 1956 report of the National 
Academy of Sciences indicated that any exposure to radioactive materials, no matter how small 
the dose, had the likelihood of causing health problems in both individual instances and for large 
segments of a population over an extended period of time.  Furthermore, genetic mutations 
would not necessarily appear immediately in individuals, but would dramatically increase the 
risks for abnormalities in genetic development of forthcoming generations.266 
In Washington County, AEC-issued reports frequently appeared in the weekly 
publication of the Washington County News, lauding safety measures and emphasizing the 
delight of scientists with the progress of their experiments.  Two days after the conclusion of the 
January-February 1951 RANGER series, an AEC announcement stressed the savings in 
“manpower, materials, money, and above all, invaluable time in the national atomic energy 
development program.”267  It further stated that AEC officials were entirely pleased with the 
management and results of the initial NTS experiment series.268  By 1955, following numerous 
accidents in prior operations, AEC officials were hedging their bets, announcing tests that were 
low-yield in order to quell fears.  The press release stated that the test series would help 
“determine the safety of various weapons and experimental devices in the event of accidents... 
during handling or storage....  It is possible that even very low scale detonations such as these 
may release enough radioactive material into the air to affect very sensitive instruments or 
processes of certain industries and research institutions.”269  Again in April 1957, the press 
release claimed that the AEC would utilize NTS for “experiments related to the safety of atomic 
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weapons during handling and storage.... There will be no nuclear detonation.”270  So concerned 
were AEC officials about public outcry that they intentionally deceived nearby residents 
regarding the perception that residents’ health may be adversely affected from fallout and 
emphasized experiments which they knew would produce no measurable radiation.271  According 
to Eugene Bridges, the AEC and supportive politicians “were totally committed and they were 
not going to let anything interfere with the continuance of that testing.”272 
Despite the culture within the AEC, administrators very early recognized the necessity of 
maintaining positive public opinion.  In addition to reaffirming constantly its commitment to 
public safety in all press releases, AEC officials were quick to point out the value of such 
experiments to maintain global stability.  The theory seems to have been that the public would 
accept the AEC’s safety assertions if the agency sufficiently emphasized the importance of the 
tests to stave off Soviet advances.273  Still, the AEC did not miss an opportunity to point out the 
high importance placed on considerations of public safety, and Dunning was the most adamant 
spokesperson to this end.  According to him, “the health and safety of persons was the major 
consideration in the original selection of the Nevada Test Site and this continues to be of 
paramount importance during the conduct of nuclear tests.”274  He went on to state that the 
paucity of inhabited land in the region offered “optimum conditions for maintenance of safety” 
and that on the “few occasions when persons have been asked to remain indoors for a few hours 
to reduce the radiation dose... the out-of-door exposure would have been far from hazardous.”275  
He also lauded the AEC’s multi-field Advisory Panel, comprised of representatives from the 
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fields of “public health, medicine, meteorology, fallout phenomenology, blast and thermal 
effects,” for considering “carefully all of the factors that insured safety” prior to each 
detonation.276  The outcomes of their deliberations were that “more than 200 delays in firing 
have been made at a cost of millions of dollars, to insure safety.”277  In addition to these 
expenditures, by 1964 the NTS budget for “operational and research studies directed toward 
safety at the Nevada Test Site” was $8 million.278 
The AEC’s public relations efforts were multi-faceted during the atmospheric testing 
period.  It is hard to imagine that more energy and resources were devoted to any other single 
aspect of its operations.  The commission had to juggle its mandate to develop and test new 
weapons with the requirement that it also establish and adhere to new safety standards for 
radiation exposure.  It regularly cited its impeccable safety record, distorted its importance in 
maintaining national security, and made fallacious arguments about the threat of Soviet 
aggression.  Further, scientists made specious arguments regarding the effect of naturally-
occurring background radiation, while receiving a pass from the media and government 
representatives who regularly deferred to AEC expertise when reporting on the commission’s 
activities or answering citizens’ concerns.  Finally, the AEC devoted large sums of money to 
promoting its activities through print, film, and educational propaganda in local newspapers, 
community gathering places, and primary schools in nearby communities, while partnering with 
the Federal Civil Defense Administration (Civil Defense) to promote its agenda and deflect 
attention and fears about nuclear weapons toward Soviet attacks.  Given that the American 
public had high hopes for the potential of nuclear energy to have a positive impact on the world, 
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it is likely that they would have agreed with the need to persevere in the testing projects if they 
had been properly educated in protective measures.279 
AEC propaganda was present from the founding of NTS, as officials used the term 
“atomic energy program” as often as possible when referring to the weapons testing program, 
emphasizing the beneficial potential for a civilian program over the malignance of devastating 
bombs.  When the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 formed the AEC, it also assigned the commission 
the primary tasks of producing the uranium and plutonium supplies for the bomb cores, as well 
as the research, development, and experimentation for innovative bomb designs.280  The creation 
of NTS in 1951 implicitly placed responsibility for public safety in AEC hands, although it was 
not until the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that this was made explicit.281  There was, from the 
outset, tension between the explicit and implicit objectives, and the requirement of reporting to 
the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy and its control of AEC funding made nuclear regulation 
a political issue which could be bartered.282  Paul Jacobs, a journalist and activist, pointed out in 
a 1957 article that “following the fundamental pattern of our government, the responsibility for 
weapons development should be separated from that of guarding public health.”283   
LASL personnel had the principal responsibility within the AEC of assessing both 
“weapons effectiveness and offsite radiation hazards.”284  In court at the Allen trial, its director, 
Norris Bradbury, scoffed “‘sure there are a few people with leukemia.  More people get killed in 
automobile accidents every hour than will die of leukemia.’”285  Bradbury’s hyperbolic statement 
ignored the fact that people volitionally get into automobiles and assume the risk associated with 
                                                 
279
 Fradkin, Fallout, p. 25. 
280
 J. Samuel Walker, Containing the Atom:  Nuclear Regulations in a Changing Environment, 1963-1971, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 1992, p. 2.  Hereafter cited as Walker—Contain. 
281
 Ibid., p. 2. 
282
 Ibid., p. 4. 
283
 Jacobs, “Clouds,” p. 29. 
284
 Fradkin, Fallout, p. 80. 
285
 Quoted in Fradkin, Fallout, p. 83. 
 85 
doing so, whereas they had no agency to choose exposure to cancer-causing radioactive fallout.  
His LASL released a report in 1950 which stated that fallout reaching the earth’s surface “in 
appreciable amounts... may represent a serious physiological hazard.”286  The real threat, 
according to this report, was that an enemy could use radiation from nuclear weapons tactically 
in order to render “certain areas uninhabitable.”287  It went on to emphasize the variations from 
individual to individual of “the susceptibility to radiation” when considering levels above “the 
tolerance doses,” a measure which the NCRP had abandoned four years earlier.288  LASL 
scientists recommended that “statistical averages must be used for practical purposes.”289  While 
this may have been appropriate for certain studies, the average used was for the entire U. S. 
population and did not include a separate calculation for those citizens living within certain 
proximate distances from the test site.  Seven years later, the AEC was still claiming it was 
conducting ongoing studies in relation to human health effects and touting its cautionary 
practices by postponing for two weeks experiments in order “to avoid unfavorable fallout on 
communities around the test site.”290  The AEC intended that these declarations would placate 
local citizens. 
AEC media reports regularly mixed in a healthy dose of national security rhetoric with its 
claims of placing priority on public safety.  Public relations efforts in the downwind region 
accelerated drastically in 1955, after a year-long hiatus from experiments at NTS resulting from 
the disasters and scares of the 1953 series, including Shots Simon and Harry.  A 1955 pamphlet 
the AEC distributed in downwind communities claimed that downwinders were “in a very real 
sense active participants” in the weapons testing experiments, “which have contributed greatly to 
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building the defenses of our own country and of the free world.”291  Distributed ahead of 
Operation TEAPOT, the pamphlet further stated that “each shot is justified by national and 
international security need and that none will be fired unless there is adequate assurance of 
public safety.”292  The citizens’ sense of pride and contribution was further stroked by the claims 
that despite the fact that “some of you have been exposed to potential risk from flash, blast, or 
fall-out... you have accepted the inconvenience or the risk without fuss, without alarm, and 
without panic... [which] has helped achieve an unusual record of safety.”293   
While this may have helped to pacify downwind residents, some editors of the nation’s 
major publications remained unconvinced.  Nora Lyman reported that at a 1957 press conference 
held by “a group of American editors,” they expressed concern over the announcement of 
penalties for the media which could prevent them from publishing information critical to 
ensuring that the American citizenry could make informed decisions about how the government 
should proceed.294  In the article, Lyman quoted Vermont C. Royster, senior associate editor of 
the Wall Street Journal, who asserted that if the media was not free to report the all of the 
relevant information, the “‘doors sealed by the rubber stamps will hide the facts from all of us.  
None of us will ever know what dark secrets are hidden behind those doors.’”295  Lyman claimed 
that “it was pointed out that once the government had this authority, any information it did not 
wish made public could be ‘classified’ in the name of ‘national security.’”296 
Not wanting to miss an opportunity to pat themselves on their backs, AEC officials often 
pointed to an established safety record in their public press releases as a means to justify the 
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commission’s continued existence.  The aforementioned AEC pamphlet heralded its record that 
“no one inside Nevada test site has been injured” and “no one outside the test site in the nearby 
region of potential exposure has been hurt” through the first thirty-one nuclear explosions at 
NTS.297  According to the document, the only casualties had been “some cattle and horses 
grazing within a few miles of the detonations [which] suffered skin deep radiation burns, but the 
damage had no effect on their breeding value nor the beef quality of the cattle.”298  It explicitly 
denied the potential of ingestion exposure for the cattle and people who may consume them, but 
the AEC had still not publicly acknowledged this threat.   
Under the section describing the upcoming TEAPOT series and procedural changes to the 
monitoring system, the AEC lauded the “considerable improvement” in safety measures by 
which it “expected to provide not only continued assurance of public safety but also... to reduce 
public exposure to a minimum.”299  This begs the question whether what the AEC had been 
promising nearby residents during previous testing series was ever actualized, since minimum 
exposure was, presumably, already a norm.  The public’s role was not diminished, however, as 
“the potential exposure of the public will be low and... can be reduced still further by continued 
public cooperation.”300  When a test shot occurred that did not result in any public concern, the 
AEC was quick to hold it up as a shining example, as in the case of Shot Zucchini of May 15, 
1955:  away from “the test site and the gunnery range all readings reported in populated 
communities were quite light, the heaviest being at Moapa, Nev., (estimated population 150) 
persons) where .68 roentgens was recorded.”301  In dealing with congressional representatives 
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from the affected downwind communities, AEC officials always maintained the same assertions:  
“the Atomic Energy Commission constantly endeavors to minimize the amounts of atmospheric 
contamination from nuclear explosions.  Further, we endeavor to keep the public fully informed 
on any biological dangers from radioactive contamination.”302 
Perhaps the favorite public relations tool at the AEC’s disposal was the threat of an attack 
by the USSR.  Early in the testing period, the AEC claimed that its weapons would deter the 
Soviets from attacking Americans on their home soil, but after their successful test of a 
thermonuclear hydrogen bomb in 1953, rhetoric turned to the imminent threat a Soviet bomb 
posed. It is not a coincidence that this escalation also occurred after the mishaps of the AEC’s 
UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE series in 1953.  For the AEC’s purposes, “America is the one country 
standing in the way of Russia’s control of the world, and as long as it is a threat to the Soviet 
Union there is the danger of an all-out war.”303   
While it is true that all three branches of government were involved in creating a national 
sense of fear of Communist infiltration, which led to the creation of the Civil Defense 
Administration, the AEC was able to harness public fear for its own purposes and survival most 
effectively.304  By teaming with Civil Defense, the AEC could deflect attention and concern from 
its testing program, which was a far closer but less insidious threat (or so they claimed).  
Numerous public relations pamphlets distributed by Civil Defense claimed that harmful fallout 
was a phenomenon of the explosion of a hydrogen bomb, implying that fallout is not hazardous 
if emanating from a standard atomic bomb like those detonated at NTS.305  Lending credibility to 
the AEC’s claims that “only when radioactivity is present in large amounts does it become 
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dangerous” and “hydrogen bomb explosions create large amounts of radioactive fallout,” were 
reports that the Soviets were detonating extremely large hydrogen bombs which were 
contaminating the western U. S. as a result of prevailing winds.306  A 1959 Civil Defense 
pamphlet warned that “alpha and beta particles may be dangerous if they are ingested through 
contaminated food, water, or air, but they have low penetrating power.”307  The AEC had been 
aware of this for years but chose not to disseminate the information, instead leaving it to Civil 
Defense to present the facts in a manner which would lead people to believe the information was 
provided to protect them from an attack rather than the negligence of their own government’s 
agency.308 
AEC scientists frequently turned to the presence of naturally-occurring background 
radiation when attempting to assuage public fears and debunk the claims of non-AEC scientific 
studies.  AEC sources noted that, while mutations in the body’s cellular composition as a result 
of radiation did occur, these “changes... occur spontaneously under normal and natural 
conditions in all kinds of animals and plants.  Normal radiation background is one factor in this 
process.”309  The AEC’s scientific assertion was that “radiation from fall-out from Nevada tests 
would have no greater effect on the human heredity process in the United States than would 
natural radiation in those parts of the Nation where normal levels are high.”310  What the 
commission neglected to address was how much more the release of radiation from NTS would 
contribute to normal background radiation, especially when combined with the U. S. hydrogen 
bomb tests in the Pacific and Soviet experiments, all of which were releasing large amounts of 
radiation.   
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Beyond these statements, AEC arguments for the natural existence of radiation became 
ridiculous at best; completely disingenuous at worst.  The non sequitur that most people are 
unable to “explain electricity, although we have learned to live with it and to use it,” therefore 
nuclear radiation can be safely utilized, was frequently used when facing angry citizens.311  Also 
popular as an AEC explanation was the proposition that people “willingly expose [them]selves to 
much heavier radiation when [they] undergo diagnostic X-rays.”312  Dunning also provided 
sleight-of-hand scientific analysis when he claimed that “fallout has not introduced a new and 
strange agent into our environment with completely unpredictable results.”313  He continued by 
stating that “to these levels of radiation exposures are now added those from fallout—but these 
radiations (gamma rays and beta particles) are no different in kind from those emanating from 
natural sources.  Nor is there any evidence that they produce any fundamentally different 
biological effects.”314 
Whether deliberately or through ignorance, media outlets and congressional 
representatives often repeated AEC reassurances verbatim and thus were complicit in the AEC’s 
deceptions.  At the conclusion of the RANGER series, the WCN reprinted directly the AEC press 
release which claimed that “‘Reports received from field survey patrols have shown no 
indication of any radiological hazards.’”315  If the media questioned the commission’s directors 
on whether there was satisfactory off-site monitoring, it went unreported.316  Again repeating an 
AEC release word for word ahead of the TEAPOT series in 1955, the local paper reported that 
danger existed only “for persons on-site,” but that off-site observers should take precautions 
                                                 
311
 United States, “Atomic Test Effects,” under the heading, “Appendix:  Guides to Understanding Fall-out:  
Radiation is Nothing New.” 
312
 Ibid. 
313
 Dunning, Health Aspects, p. 1. 
314
 Ibid., p. 1. 
315
 WCN, “A-Bomb Blast Queries Answered by Commission, February 1, 1951, p. 8. 
316
 Ibid., p. 8. 
 91 
since “the flash of light... can cause temporary eye damage under some circumstances.”317  It 
also stated that “radioactive exposure levels within the bombing range could be hazardous,” 
implying that no danger existed from radiation for persons outside the boundaries of NTS.318  In 
an effort to reassure Washington County’s residents, the AEC invited “the mayors of Hurricane, 
Washington, St. George, and Santa Clara and the director of civil defense in Washington county 
[sic]... to witness the atomic bomb explosion near a typical townsite prepared on the Nevada 
proving grounds April 26.”319  It is unclear whether they were able to attend, as there is no record 
of a test shot occurring on April 26. 
Douglas R. Stringfellow, one of Utah’s U. S. House Representatives (1953-1955), had 
questioned the effects of weapons testing following shot Harry in May 1953, declaring that he 
would investigate on behalf of “alarmed” constituents.  After visiting NTS to observe a test shot 
on May 25, 1953 (six days after Harry and at the AEC’s personal invitation), Stringfellow 
retracted his earlier skepticism and announced that the AEC was making every effort to protect 
downwinders from unnecessary exposure.320  Following this observation, Stringfellow informed 
AEC chairman Lewis Lichtenstein Strauss that he had given 
several speeches and radio broadcasts in my district and also issued press releases in which I 
reassured the people of Utah that every precautionary measure was being taken to protect 
their health and welfare.  I also attempted to allay their fears and reassure them that the 
degree of radiation from atomic fallout was so low that it could not have any adverse effect 
on their physical well-being.321 
 
William Adams Dawson, who served with Stringfellow in the U. S. House (1947-1949, 
1953-1959), wrote to a senior case worker for the Utah County Department of Public Welfare in 
Provo, Utah, that he would not back a federal bill for cancer research funding since “the Federal 
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Government through the Atomic Energy Program and through the National Science Foundation 
is at the present time making a sizeable contribution to cancer research....  This, of course, would 
create a new Federal bureau which is in itself wasteful.  It would also have the effect of placing 
the entire burden of cancer research on the Government.”322  In 1957, he responded to a letter 
from a concerned citizen of the Salt Lake City area, acknowledging “disagreements among the 
experts on the effect of fall-out,” but claimed that the “differences are of degree, not of kind, so 
that a pretty reliable range of values can be established.”323  He cited the AEC’s statistic that 
“1,500 to 9,000 children (of the two billion [born in the next generation worldwide]... will bear 
detectable defects owing to fall-out,” then asserted that, while he did not claim expertise, he did 
“believe that those tests are being conducted by competent and conscientious men who would 
not take unreasonable chances with our future generations.”324  Apparently he was blissful in his 
ignorance, as there is no evidence that he undertook any investigation as to the veracity of this 
claim. 
Utah’s U. S. Senators also engaged with their constituency during this period on the 
effects of radioactive fallout.  Wallace Foster Bennett (served 1951-1975), one of the members 
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and vice-chairman of the Ethics committee, replied to 
a St. George high school principal in 1957 that there was not “any subject in which there is more 
emotion and less real knowledge than in this question:  ‘What are the possible effects of atomic 
and nuclear explosions?’”325  His ethics work seems to have failed Bennett in this instance, since 
as a member of the JCAE he would have had access to classified scientific studies.  Bennett 
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continued, claiming that the testing could not be eliminated since it offered “the only way to 
know [we] have created a weapon of a special type.”326  He also claimed that the Department of 
Defense would not relocate the experiments because “they have spent large sums of money in 
equipping the area with the necessary precautions and with the equipment needed to make the 
tests, and I am sure there are no justifications for abandoning this area, especially since they 
spent lots of time selecting the best site in the first place.”327  He concluded by professing his 
“personal impression that the damage of current and future tests will be less than those of some 
other tests in the past.”328 
Senator Frank Moss was by far the most sensitive to the concerns of Utahns regarding the 
nearby testing, yet he tended to waver in the face of political pressure from his congressional 
colleagues and the AEC.  However, he did not take office until 1959, and it would be unfair to 
assert that he possessed adequate political influence to make necessary changes during the 
atmospheric testing years.  While he may have “seemed very much aware of the dangers to our 
children and to the unborn generations which have been created by the nuclear tests already 
completed,” Moss maintained that “explanations are no substitute for action that will help 
remove the threat of nuclear war.”329  Behind his office door, however, he undertook to pressure 
the AEC.  In a 1963 letter to AEC chairman Glenn Seaborg, Moss noted the “very heavy 
contamination in parts of Utah from nuclear explosions” which resulted in calls “for intensified 
study of the health of children and others who live in the area.”330  Moss fully endorsed these 
proposed measures, stating his conviction “that we should arm ourselves with all the information 
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possible on the results of nuclear fallout,” and asked for future tests to be restricted to non-
grazing seasons.331  Seaborg responded to Moss’s letter by asserting that “we have no evidence 
that the levels of radioactivity resulting from the Commission’s testing activities at the Nevada 
Test Site have been the cause of any thyroid cancer or leukemia in any individual,” but noted that 
the AEC had requested the U.S. Public Health Service “to undertake studies in the Utah/Nevada 
area on thyroid cancer cases.”332  Seaborg also averred that restricting testing to winter months 
would likely eliminate I-131 in milk, but claimed that this “could place unacceptable restrictions 
on the conduct of important tests.”333  Despite his position in this instance, Moss maintained a 
posturing stance to his constituents rather than attempting to build a coalition to oppose the AEC. 
A likely reason that there was not greater public outcry during the early testing years is 
that the AEC began producing numerous pieces of propaganda for distribution among downwind 
communities early on, but drastically increased these efforts following the mishaps of the Spring 
1953 test series.  Although the AEC had moved all atmospheric tests to the Marshall Islands for 
1954, by March of that year officials were distributing films to Civil Defense offices for public 
viewings.  Washington County Civil Defense director LeRoy Bailey showed the films 
“Operation Crossroads” and “The Evacuation of Civilians” to various public groups in St. 
George, with the promise that other towns in Washington County would also have an 
opportunity to view them in their locales.334  In its Atomic Test Effects pamphlet the following 
year, the AEC wanted no ambiguity in the public’s understanding of its programs.  It implored 
citizens to “understand that we are not talking about high yield A-bombs or H-bombs tested 
elsewhere.  We are not discussing radiation from enemy bombs designed to do the most damage 
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possible.  We are talking only about low-yield tests, conducted under controlled conditions at the 
Nevada Test Site.”335  The commission attempted to boost morale in Washington County with a 
new film, released in St. George toward the end of the TEAPOT series:   
Atomic ‘fallout’ in the St. George area about one year ago particularly when everyone was 
requested to stay indoors for almost two hours, caused so much concern that the AEC not 
only investigated carefully, but decided to make a film of the incident, incorporating some 
of the tests and other features as well.  This week the picture, in Technicolor and showing 
St. George streets and residents, is having its premiere here and was shown in the chamber 
meeting.336 
 
Lyman remarked in her “Observations” column the following week that the film would no doubt 
“travel all over the nation, and many of our former Dixieites will no doubt see it, and I venture a 
momentary pang of homesickness will possess them as they see our streets and the everyday 
activities going along.”337   
The “peaceful” uses for atomic energy were also extolled.  Standard Oil Company 
featured a full-page advertisement in the WCN in August 1956 which claimed that its close 
collaboration with the AEC was producing results in discovering “lubricants for atomic 
machinery able to withstand withering radiation... [which would] speed the day when 
commercial atomic power will help drive planes and ships, and generate electricity for your 
home.”338  One year later, the AEC launched a travelling “Atoms for Peace” exhibit, which it 
claimed would provide “a comprehensive picture of the ways in which the peaceful atom is 
playing an important role in everyday life....  There is no admission charge—every resident of 
Washington county [sic] is invited to visit the exhibit for an informative glimpse of the peaceful 
atom.”339 
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While they may have been endangering adults and children of all ages, AEC officials did 
not neglect secondary school students in their indoctrination schemes.  The Office of Civil and 
Defense Mobilization reported that 15,000 high schools nationwide would be receiving 
radiological kits by September 1958.  It announced that with “the cooperation of the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare and the State Education Departments, science teachers in 
these schools are conducting instruction in radiological defense topics in connection with science 
courses.  One million students will receive such instruction by June 1959.”340  Shortly after the 
atmospheric testing period ended, the director of the AEC’s Division of Technical Information, 
Edward J. Brunenkant, wrote David Sjodahl King, Utah’s U. S. Representative (1959-1963, 
1965-1967) to inform him that 
The Atomic Energy Commission has for several years sponsored lecture demonstration 
programs to acquaint secondary school students and their teachers with the basic principles 
and the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.  In this activity, AEC-trained lecturers 
provide a basic introduction to the subject at student assemblies, utilizing colorful 
demonstration equipment.  At most schools they meet also with selected science classes to 
help the teachers familiarize their students with specific aspects of nuclear science.341 
 
The Civil Defense program received greater emphasis in Washington County beginning 
in 1954, if frequency of WCN articles is an accurate indicator.  The local division of the 
volunteer agency was showing Civil Defense films that spring in order “to make the residents of 
Washington county aware of the importance and significance of this nationwide project.”342  By 
1956, links to the AEC experiments became more prominent, as one article claimed that “fallout 
is now one of the principal nuclear dangers with which civil defense must contend.  Civilians 
will be told to seek shelter in basements, ‘cyclone’ shelters and the like if fallout from a nuclear 
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explosion is heading their way;” the implication here is that it would be fallout from a Soviet 
attack.343  The focus had turned to a Soviet hydrogen bomb attack, in which case Civil Defense 
would work “to assure survival of the greatest number of persons if some day an American sky 
lights up like a hundred suns.”344  Civil Defense members also stressed that “the most important 
people for civilian defense are those in the rural areas, such as Washington county [sic], who 
would be the actual survivors in the event of bombings of our country.”345  As well, they warned 
that windblown fallout from a high-yield “bomb on the west coast could be deadly in 
Washington county [sic]....  America is the one country standing in the way of Russia’s control 
of the world, and as long as it is a threat to the Soviet Union there is the danger of an all-out 
war.”346 
Speculation of the AEC’s manipulation of information is corroborated by its own internal 
documentation, some of which survived Department of Energy destruction.  A 1948 AEC staff 
report, entitled “Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons,” stated the belief that “‘a 
properly conducted public information program stressing radiological safety factors as a result of 
prevailing winds could overcome adverse public reaction’” on a large scale, while nullifying 
localized opposition by questioning patriotism and suggesting Communist sympathies.347  
Gordon Dean, AEC chairman when NTS was founded, held himself to a strict policy of only 
divulging information to direct questions and even then providing answers which left the issue 
“‘completely fuzzed up.’”348  In the spring of 1953, the AEC provided advance warnings of 
possible fallout to the National Association of Photographic Manufacturers, but not to the 
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downwind population.349  By March 1953, there was no admission in the AEC’s publicly 
disseminated information pamphlets that the potential of cancer development existed many years 
after exposure, although there was a plethora of extant and accumulating evidence from 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.350  This is corroborated by the interview with James Yamazaki.   
Additionally, the AEC continued to present publicly the threshold theory of harmful 
radiation, claiming that people suffer injury from radiation exposure “only if too many cells are 
damaged or destroyed at one time, or are destroyed continuously in certain organs of the body 
over a long period of time.”351  What scientists knew but did not admit was that this only applied 
to immediately observable maladies, and they ignored the long-term health consequences of 
exposure to the smallest amounts of radiation.  The next section contained outright deception, as 
it claimed that the human body is capable of receiving “considerably greater doses of radiation 
[above normal-background] because the effects are repaired almost as rapidly as they are 
produced.  Over a period of many years, a human may safely receive in small doses a total 
amount of radiation which would cause fatal illness if administered to his whole body within a 
period of a few minutes.”352 
The focus on misrepresenting the dangers of the AEC’s experiments exacerbated 
problems with the offsite monitoring procedures.  The AEC did not make necessary adjustments 
to its monitoring of downwind communities because its officials were concerned that increasing 
its presence in these areas would result in heightened public and political scrutiny of the 
necessity of operating a continental test site.  The National Research Council’s I-131 study found 
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that “the exposure of the public was inadequately monitored,” despite the many assertions the 
AEC made to the contrary.353  At the beginning of the RANGER series, the AEC prohibited 
flights over the test site and, by the end of the year, placed restrictions on “all aircraft entering or 
operating within a 200-mile radius from Las Vegas,” although ground monitoring did not extend 
more than a few miles offsite.354  By 1953, the AEC had extended the range of monitors, but they 
still only operated along highways and major unpaved roads, while receiving procedural 
directions in the field which limited their practical effectiveness.  These monitors also often 
treated their responsibilities lightly.  AEC officials and Public Health and Safety monitors joked 
years later that they were convincing downwind residents through public relations efforts that 
they were safe while the AEC was exposing off-site residents to radiation.355  The AEC’s Atomic 
Test Effects pamphlet directed downwind residents “to open windows and doors to equalize 
pressure” inside their homes in order to mitigate the force of the blast from detonations.356  There 
were no instructions to then reseal the home so that wind-blown radioactive dust would not enter 
the home as easily. 
One complication resulting from the limited monitoring system was the inability of field 
monitors and aerial surveys to detect radioactive hot spots, “localized areas of enhanced fallout 
deposition that would be of radiological concern.”357  These hot spots were of particular concern 
to Washington County since it is such a large area and residents during the period could remain 
in remote areas away from population centers for extended periods of time.  Later studies 
showed that people coming into contact with hot spots may have experienced radiation exposure 
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levels which were “thousands or millions of times greater than average levels.”358  Rural 
residents and residents of the smaller hamlets in Washington County were particularly 
susceptible, since the AEC often neglected to warn them of the impending danger even though 
these areas often experienced heavier fallout levels than in St. George.359  In Gunlock, the local 
teacher reportedly had “no recollection of ever being told to keep indoors the dozen children who 
attended the one-room schoolhouse.  Neither she nor the owner of the general store recalls ever 
seeing any monitors in or around Gunlock during the Upshot-Knothole tests of 1953.”360  Also, 
because rainfall is a precious occurrence in desert environs, thunderstorms in the area presented a 
serious threat because rain showers occurring in conjunction with passing radioactive clouds 
dramatically increase the prevalence of radioactive hot spots.361 
Even if monitors had notified all rural residents and detected all hot spots, it is likely the 
AEC would not have admitted to any existing danger.  AEC pamphlets repeatedly diminished the 
potential dangers of fallout, likening burns from radioactive beta particles to “burns produced by 
heat, except that they appear only after one or two weeks and heal slowly and more imperfectly... 
barely penetrate the skin and produce no other damage to the body.”362  When winds began to 
carry radioactive clouds toward the observation stations miles away during a 1957 shot, officials 
immediately ordered the withdrawal of “several hundred scientists and observers,” although, 
according to later AEC reports, the clouds carried “‘only very light fallout’” and “there would 
have been no danger had the people remained.”363  Later studies determined that while “the 
official limit was 3.9 rads per year for the public downwind of the atmospheric tests... action 
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tended not to be taken until doses reached or exceeded the level at which immediate radiation 
symptoms became manifest.”364  During the ‘Dirty Harry’ Shot, the AEC told people that the 
radiation level was not dangerous because there were no immediately observable indicators.365  
This was a distinct “example of how public education became so mixed up with public relations 
that the official goal of safety was largely subverted.”366 
When dealing with public safety concerns, the AEC employed several methods, generally 
according to which source was raising questions.  At times, officials would attempt to discredit 
scientific studies which questioned the genetic and health effects of low-level radiation exposure, 
claiming the researchers had manipulated the results as a result of having been biased.367  At 
other times, the AEC withheld pertinent information by having documents classified due to the 
presence of “military information,” often citing matters of national security to shield its non-
security-related practices.368  More often, the AEC exerted its considerable influence to ensure 
that medical research went unpublished or to keep local health practitioners from speaking about 
the associated dangers, thereby preventing mass panic in communities which had begun to speak 
openly about radiation dangers.369  When dealing with inquiries from Utah’s politicians, the 
favored practice of AEC officials was to send standardized form letters reiterating the necessity 
of the experiments to national security and always with some version of the caveat that “all 
precautions were taken in the Nevada tests to keep off-site radiation to a minimum.  The addition 
to worldwide fallout would be negligible.”370  For citizens, the message remained unchanged 
(except in the case of a Soviet attack):  “Your best action is not to be worried about fall-out....  If 
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you think that maybe you have been in fall-out, or if you have other questions, get in touch with 
our monitors or with the Test Organization.  Your questions will be answered.”371 
Washington County residents did not have their questions answered accurately though, 
and given the degree of contamination and the problems associated with decontamination, their 
exposure became exponentially worse.  LASL had published its findings relative to 
decontamination procedures in 1950 in a book prepared for and in cooperation with the 
Department of Energy and the AEC.  It stated that there were no means by which to “neutralize 
the radioactivity;” it was only possible to “transfer the active material from one place to 
another.”372  In order to make a contaminated area “habitable within a reasonable time,” all 
“loose material which might form dust that would be inhaled or ingested with food” would need 
to be disposed of or covered up.373  Rooftops would present a significant challenge, since they 
“would collect considerable amounts of radioactive material, but could not be easily 
decontaminated.”374  Decontaminating soil would also be extremely problematic, as “the 
radioactivity will remain in the uppermost few inches.”375  The suggested solution to the 
quandary was “to remove it or cover it with at least a foot of fresh soil.”376  Additionally, 
“clothing, as well as rugs, curtains, and upholstered furniture” which had been contaminated 
“would have to be discarded and buried or burned in proper incinerators designed to prevent the 
escape of radioactive smoke.”377  Washington County’s citizens never received these warnings or 
decontamination procedures from AEC officials who were concerned that public dissemination 
of these facts would spark an enormous public outcry. 
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A few high-profile individuals, including politicians, scientists and activists, did speak 
out against the weapons testing program.  The press and the constituency of a Nevada state 
legislator who called for an end to detonations at NTS excoriated him publicly; the state bill 
which he had introduced died while still in committee.378  Senator Edward Lewis Bartlett (D-
Alaska, 1959-1968) gave a speech on the Senate floor in 1963 in which he outlined the plethora 
of issues facing his Alaskan constituents, as well as Americans in general.  Entitled “Fallout 
Monitoring:  We Must Do Better:  We Could Hardly Do Worse,” Bartlett’s speech quoted a 1962 
United Nations report which asserted that  
It is clearly established that exposure to radiation, even in doses substantially lower than 
those producing acute effects, may occasionally give rise to a wide variety of harmful effects 
including cancer, leukemia and inherited abnormalities which in some cases may not be 
easily distinguishable from naturally occurring conditions or identifiable as due to radiation.  
Because of the available evidence that genetic damage occurs at the lowest levels as yet 
experimentally tested, it is prudent to assume that some genetic damage may follow any 
dose of radiation, however small.379 
 
He claimed that the AEC’s “radiation surveillance and control program is no more than an 
ineffective gesture,” and called on the president “to stop treating radiation as once we treated 
cancer.  It exists, it threatens us.  It must not be hidden away as cancer once was.”380   
American scientist Linus Carl Pauling, instrumental in proving that strontium-90 from 
atmospheric tests in cow’s milk was a significant public health threat, calculated in 1957 that 
fallout-induced leukemia was responsible for a minimum of ten thousand American casualties.381  
Rachel Louise Carson, an American marine biologist and preservationist, admitted to the 
presence of natural background radiation in her 1962 work, Silent Spring, but pointed out that 
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living organisms had “millennia” to adapt to relatively constant levels of background radiation, 
whereas the rapid introduction into the atmosphere of new and increased levels of radiation 
destabilized the delicate balance which had been achieved over eons.382  German physician Dr. 
Albert Schweitzer, who politicians frequently misquoted or whose quotations they often repeated 
out of context, stated in 1957 that  
we are forced to regard every increase in the existing danger through further creation of 
radioactive elements by atom bomb explosions as a catastrophe for the human race, a 
catastrophe that must be prevented under every circumstance....  The end of further 
experiments with atom bombs would be like the early sun rays of hope which suffering 
humanity is longing for.383   
 
Schweitzer’s statement, that “even today, we must concede to each nation the right to stand 
ready to defend itself with the terrible weapons now at its disposal,” which American politicians 
most often used to justify and defend the weapons testing program, went on to implore that 
humans needed “to take the first step along this new highway [of peaceful existence].  Not one of 
them will lose a fraction of the power necessary for their own defense.”384 
The evidence of AEC negligence and deception is overwhelming.  In the years of 
atmospheric testing, “105 tests were conducted above ground surface at NTS and 14 other tests 
were at depths where containment was not expected.  The total nuclear yield of these detonations 
was approximately one megaton of TNT-equivalent explosive energy,” the same as an early 
hydrogen bomb being dropped on Nevada.385  While it is true that this was less concentrated over 
a thirteen-year period than a single hydrogen weapon detonation, one must also consider that 
because of variable winds the multiple detonations scattered fallout over a much greater area 
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than that of a single detonation.  Speaking to the JCAE in 1959 of the devastating results of the 
AEC’s experiments, Dr. Charles C. Price of the University of Pennsylvania claimed that AEC 
researchers acceded that radiation exposures below the maximum permissible dose were not 
harmless.  He continued his passionate speech by questioning the AEC’s integrity: 
Do the AEC scientists believe 100,000 additional cases of leukemia a year are permissible?  
Or is it only 10,000 cases a year?  How many additional deformed children per year do they 
consider permissible?...  It is not clear and obvious to the general public, nor even to 
scientists, which deformed children or which leukemia cases were the result of bomb testing 
rather than natural or other causes.  It is therefore extremely important that the public be 
informed of and be willing to accept the degree of hazard which the AEC calls 
‘permissible.’...  It seems extremely dangerous and undesirable to have the definition of 
what is ‘permissible’ so completely lodged with the AEC.  It has been demonstrated in many 
serious instances that this agency is indeed capable of suppressing important information 
detrimental to its interests and of distorting news so as to mislead the public.386 
 
Undeterred, AEC officials continued their deceptive practices and policy of suppressing 
accurate information.  Douglas Grahn, a geneticist in the AEC’s Division of Biology and 
Medicine, testified before the JCAE that “it can be assumed that a series of short duration high 
intensity exposures, even to low total doses,” would pose serious health risks.387  In certain 
instances though, high intensity exposures led to high total doses.  A 1962 AEC report found 
that, following Shot Harry in 1953, St. George children “may have received doses to the thyroid 
of radioiodine as high as 120 to 440 rads,” far exceeding the limits proposed and allegedly 
upheld by the AEC.388  Even after the “scientific consensus” he claimed existed had been 
debunked years earlier; even after his own colleagues within the AEC produced evidence that 
residents, including children, had received exposures well in excess of the maximum permissible 
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dose limit, Dr. Gordon Dunning continued to maintain that “only a few individuals have 
exceeded by small amounts the criterion of 10 roentgens in 10 years established for the Nevada 
Test Site.”389  The AEC deliberately manipulated records it released to the public, 
underestimated exposure levels, produced inaccurate fallout maps, and made a mockery of 
legitimate offsite monitoring procedures.  Furthermore, according to a 1980 Federal Government 
report, the accuracy of the monitoring instruments themselves may have been off by as much as 
30%.”390  In 1991, the IPPNW reported it had found sufficient  
evidence that conscious decisions were made to accept harm to people and to the 
environment in the pursuit of larger and more deadly nuclear arsenals.  The need for military 
secrecy was inappropriately used to conceal information vital to protecting the public health.  
The report does not emphasize these observations about the morality of what was done.  
Rather, it tries to present the evidence.  But for those who study the issue or read between 
the lines, this readiness to harm is omnipresent.391 
 
In light of the massive efforts which the AEC undertook to prevent full disclosure of the 
nature of the effects of fallout, it is not surprising that there was such limited public opposition to 
its activities.  There is enough evidence to suggest that there was some awareness among 
Washingtonians that government officials were not entirely truthful, yet, most of the local 
population remained largely supportive of the AEC’s activities.  Washingtonians had their own 
ideas about how best to prosper in their southwestern desert environment, and they developed 
correlative economic agendas pertaining to the AEC and its experiments that incentivized their 
reluctance to protest with much fervor. 
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SILENCE DOWNWIND:  THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESTRUCTIVE LAND USE, FEDERAL 
LARGESSE, AND PUBLIC ACQUIESENCE 
 
“Our grandsires freed this virgin continent, plowed it from east to west, and gave it to us.  This 
land is for us and for our children to make richer and more fruitful....  Our rules are nature’s 
rules, the laws of God.  We command the magic of the seasons and the miracles of science, 
because we obey nature’s rules....  We work with brains.  We toil with muscles of steel, fed by the 
fires of lightning and by oils from the inner earth.  We are partners with the laboratory, with the 
factory, and with all the people.  We provide industry with ever-renewable raw materials from 
the inexhaustible world of plants....  We have proven a new pattern of abundance.”392 
 
Underlying the public’s acceptance of a continental nuclear weapons test site was a 
cultural philosophy of the proper use of “worthless” land.  A cultural imperative which had 
existed from the nation’s founding dictated that land and natural resources should be exploited 
for the benefit of industrial progress.  The desert environment of the U. S. southwest, particularly 
in southern Nevada and Utah, contained immense mineral deposits, provided a great deal of 
sparsely populated land, and, as of 1941 when the United States entered World War II, had yet to 
see substantial economic development.  In 1952, Nevada Governor Charles Hinton Russell 
stated, “It’s exciting to think that the sub-marginal land of the proving ground is furthering 
science and helping national defense.  We had long ago written off that terrain as wasteland, and 
today it’s blooming with atoms.”393  His statement epitomizes contemporary attitudes many 
Americans held about the utility which the natural environment of the Southwest provided:  it 
was a “wasteland” of “sub-marginal” real estate, and the prevailing idea was that there was 
simply nothing there.  However, there were numerous ventures in which Washingtonians and 
their governmental representatives were involved, and it seems that the promise of local 
economic prosperity played a significant role in minimizing the degree to which these people 
were willing to voice publicly their concerns with regard to the activities at the nearby nuclear 
testing facility. 
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There was a distinct narrative in American culture during this period which promoted 
industrial advances as both the means for human progress and the means by which a communist 
takeover of the world might be averted.  Politicians, media outlets, and federal agencies all were 
complicit in propagandizing the issue and enabling industrial ventures to exploit barren and 
underutilized land in pursuit of a better life for Americans.  A 1961 WCN article promoted the 
use of chemical preservatives in food supplies, stating that “our U.S. Department of Agriculture 
and our Food and Drug Administration are still cooperating to keep our food supply the cleanest, 
the safest and most wholesome in the world today.”394  One week before the 1962 election, the 
WCN printed an advertisement for Republican pundits that lauded the economic prosperity 
resulting from fourteen years of Republican control of state affairs and promised further 
prosperity:  “Dixie stands on the threshold of a new era with its prospects for industry and 
projects featuring our winter climate....  We live in an amazing period of change and progress.  
We want to keep in step with the times.”395 
During the atmospheric testing period, prevailing public opinion held that private 
enterprise offered the optimal prescription for public land use.  Shortly after President Dwight 
David Eisenhower appointed Oregon politician James Douglas McKay as Secretary of the 
Interior in 1953, Utah Representative William Dawson wrote to encourage him to support 
economic and commercial development of public lands in the West.  Dawson asserted that 
previous Interior Secretaries had declared sizeable sections of public land in the West 
unavailable for private development.396  Dawson firmly supported opening these areas to such 
activity, as “both the Federal Government and the states are losing the opportunity of receiving 
the benefits of any metal or mineral resources that could be discovered and developed if the land 
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were open to entry.”397  Dawson seemed to believe that the influence of lawyers from eastern 
states was having a detrimental effect on an audit of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 
and claimed that since “some 95% of the department’s business deals with the Western States,” 
the challenges facing the BLM “would be better understood by attorneys who are familiar with 
some of these problems first hand.”398  Essentially, Dawson believed these eastern pundits held 
higher regard for preserving western lands in pristine conditions for eastern tourists, rather than 
considering the impact of restrictive economic policies on local communities.  He told one of his 
constituents that while he took pride in the results of his efforts at “preserving our scenic and 
wilderness areas” in the West, he believed there were certain “extreme proposals... [which] could 
be very damaging to our economy.”399 
Nora Lyman used her WCN column to outline her attitude toward economic progress in 
western lands, claiming that the dam being built at Glen Canyon near the Utah border in Arizona, 
despite its distance from the area, would “bring untold revenue from many sources.”400  
Furthermore, she rightly recognized that the “search for minerals and oil is fast proving 
profitable factors in the local economy, and I predict a real opening throughout the area in these 
industries, as well as others allied with them.”401  Still, Lyman did not subscribe to unmitigated 
exploitation of the natural environment.  In discussing the dichotomy of use and preservation 
inherent in the National Park System, she indicated that she believed natural resources in 
protected areas could be extracted while maintaining a wilderness character.  To Lyman, an 
“expanding economy” demanded that human managers ensure that “wilderness contributes its 
proper part in meeting those [economic] demands,” and that pristine land should remain 
                                                 
397
 Ibid. 
398
 Dawson to McKay, May 8, 1953, Dawson MS, Box 21, Folder 5. 
399
 Dawson to I. Bruce McQuarrie, M.D., July 30, 1957, Dawson MS, Box 21, Folder 8. 
400
 WCN, “Observations,” May 10, 1956, p. 1. 
401
 Ibid., p. 1. 
 110 
protected only as long as “the useful benefits that flow from its unimpaired natural scene are 
sufficient to justify its continuation.”402 
Lyman’s opinion of wilderness preservation is representative of mainstream opinion in 
the period, and especially of Utah’s politicians.  Representative Dawson responded to a letter 
from a Californian in 1955 by stating that while the writer’s “attitude of preservation of the 
birthright of every American citizen to the enjoyment and use of our lands is praiseworthy,” he 
would not support a specific piece of legislation to restrict further resource extraction on public 
lands since “I come from a state where mining and exploration for minerals is very important.”403  
Furthermore, Dawson argued that “since human nature has not as yet reached an alturistic [sic] 
height, precautions must be obtained through legislation channels to keep for all the people of the 
present and our future generations these elements of our national inheritance.”404   
Representative Sherman Parkinson Lloyd also supported “the proper use of wilderness 
areas for full benefit of society.”405  According to Lloyd, the government must guard wilderness 
“against excessive lockup of resources which would handicap the economic development of the 
west.”406  A month later, Lloyd wrote to a constituent that while he was “not committed to either 
side of the controversy, I certainly do recognize the need to preserve some of our land from 
commercial exploitation.”407  However, Lloyd declared that he would not support the wilderness 
bill being considered at the time, presumably because it would block certain economic and 
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industrial developments.408  Lloyd had initially refused to support a bill for an improved highway 
through an undeveloped canyon, but stated in a letter to a U. S. Forest Service employee that 
“there is absolutely no question in my mind but that the beautiful scenery can be appreciated 
more from a safe road than an unsafe road.  Furthermore, it can not only be better appreciated, 
but the scenery itself is vastly improved when viewed from the improved highway.”409 
While Lloyd tended to take a gentler tone, Representative Dawson was scornful in his 
appraisals of environmental activists.  In a 1953 letter to Secretary McKay, Dawson claimed that 
the “‘nature lovers’” who were opposing the construction of a dam at Echo Park in Dinosaur 
National Monument “just don’t know what they are talking about.”410  He later intimated to 
House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee Chairman Arthur Lewis Miller that 
environmentalists were “persons who generally are unfamiliar with the effect of the Dam on the 
development of the [Dinosaur National] Monument” and who made opposition arguments 
“based upon emotion rather than fact.”411  To refute arguments made by opposition groups, 
Dawson included an itemized Fiction v. Fact list in his letter to Miller.  He asserted that the 
reservoir the dam would create would not cause damage to fossil beds; that a 200-foot deep 
reservoir would not “affect the grandeur of the scenery” since the canyon walls were 3,000-feet 
high; that “the Dam would substitute still water in the bottom of the scenic canyon areas for 
rapids which now can be negotiated only under the guidance of experience river runners and 
always with risk to the traveler, and at an expense of time and money out of range of the ordinary 
tourist;” and that nearby residents had been assured in 1937, when the boundaries of the 
monument were extended, “that the enlargement would not interfere with power and water 
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projects in the river canyons.”412  To Dawson, the project would provide additional “power and 
water resources” to his state, and he believed the construction of a dam at that location would 
make “available to the public the beauty of the scenery of this area.”413  Ultimately, politicians 
gave up on the Echo Park Dam Project, instead agreeing with activists to relocate the dam to 
Glen Canyon near Page, Arizona, as part of the Colorado River Storage Project of 1956. 
While Dawson paid a degree of lip-service to environmental preservation concerns, his 
work on the dam project and his insistence on the importance of mining ventures to Utah’s 
economy revealed his true loyalties.  Like other politicians from Utah, he felt that America’s 
strength and “national inheritance” were to be found in its mineral wealth and the ability of 
corporate interests to access and exploit these natural resources.  The Utah Mining Association 
(UMA) frequently featured a small advertisement in the WCN (and likely in other community 
publications throughout Utah) entitled “Miner Mike says...,” which the association used as a 
platform to influence public opinion in favor of various mining ventures.  Miner Mike seems to 
have been an everyman-type fictional character that worked for the mining industry and was the 
mouthpiece for promoting a “sensible” attitude of environmental exploitation.  Mike claimed that 
his mining job provided “the satisfaction of earning a good living,” while at the same time 
“helping to transform what otherwise would be worthless material into metal products, mak[ing] 
life easier for others.”414  In one patriotic piece, Mike states that “strong countries produce more, 
and the countries that produce more have won the wars they fought against their enemies.  That’s 
why Utah’s mining industry is going all out for production.  We know what our freedom cost... 
and we’re going to make sure we keep it.”415   
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Following the 1952 election cycle, the UMA seems to have become concerned with the 
proposition of tax hikes and wage increases on its operations, as a Miner Mike ad appeared 
which claimed that a mine must remain profitable for corporations in order to be a worthwhile 
endeavor.  The scare-tactic ad stated that “if costs of supplies, labor and taxes get too high, and 
profits disappear... no more mine, no more benefits to everyone in Utah.  That’s happening right 
now in Utah!”416  Mining operations did, in fact, continue to be profitable, and by the mid-1950s 
UMA had phased out the “Miner Mike says...” feature, though it continued to run ads.  A 1960 
advertisement asserted that “mining is the starting point for economic benefits that spread to 
every corner of Utah.  Mining results in milling, milling calls for smelting, smelting brings 
refining and refining attracts fabricating plants.  These widening economic circles produce more 
jobs, bigger payrolls, growing supply purchases and increasing tax payments.”417 
The Kennecott Copper Corporation was one of the largest mining companies operating in 
Utah from the 1940s through the 1970s.  The Utah Copper Division of Kennecott promoted itself 
as “A Good Neighbor Helping to Build a Better Utah,” and purchased a two-page advertisement 
in the WCN in February 1952 featuring a picture of the open-pit Bingham Canyon Mine.  
According to the ad, the mine had produced more than 11 billion pounds of copper, 621 million 
tons of mined and milled ore, and 1.3 billion tons of removed ore and waste by the beginning of 
1952.418  Such was the manner in which the Bingham mine had ushered in “a new era in 
copper—an era that proved the mine at Bingham was not a worthless piece of Utah’s landscape, 
as some experts then believed, but a vast source of vitally needed copper.”419  It claimed that 
Utah’s wasteland had actually been at the forefront for the industrialists to develop “a better way 
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to obtain copper,” thus ensuring that “the people of Utah live better.”420  Representative Sherman 
Lloyd wrote to the Kennecott Copper Corporation’s public relations division to request “a 
picture of Kennecott’s open-cut copper mine,” as he was planning on “decorating my office with 
significant photos of industry in my District....  Upon receipt, I would have it framed here, and it 
would occupy a prominent place in the outer office.”421 
While the Kennecott operation and other mining ventures were important for Utah in 
general, Washington County’s most important mineral resource in the 1950s and 1960s was 
uranium, and the federal government, in the form of the AEC, was the driving force for 
detecting, extracting, and manufacturing the metal.  Its total control over the processing of 
uranium and nuclear weapons resulted in an “artificial mining boom” throughout the West.422  
As the Cold War grew more heated during the 1950s, the AEC increased uranium purchases, and 
by 1955 the AEC devoted over $52 million per annum on uranium-related manufacture.  From 
the establishment of the AEC in 1946 until 1971 when “the uranium program ended, the 
commission spent $2.9 billion and bought 348 million tons of the ore,” all of which it spent in 
the West.423 
Silver Reef, located about fifteen miles northeast of St. George, had been a silver mining 
town since the 1870s and became a ghost town until uranium was discovered there.  Uranium 
mining began there in 1951 under the supervision of Frank L. Morgan, a mining operator from 
Springville, UT, who offered to consult with any prospectors who brought ore to his 
establishment and to help them operate their Geiger counters efficiently in order to promote the 
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search for the mineral and expansion of the industry in Washington County.424  By July 1952, 
Utah had become home to “three uranium ore processing mills” as well as “two ore buying 
stations,” with “a third Utah ore-buying station... scheduled for early operation at Greenriver.”425  
The AEC owned two of the three mills.  A report cited in the article of the “raw materials 
subcommittee of the joint congressional committee on atomic energy,” stated that “here is a great 
desert and mountain region essentially without roads or water, but containing many miles of out-
crop, which, we are informed, encourages exploration for the development of uranium.”426  In 
September 1953, an article appeared which reported that “drilling for uranium opened up in a 
new area this week about ten miles east of St. George where gieger [sic] counters show heavy 
radioactivity.”427  Since there was no further mention of continuing mining activities at this 
location, and given the timing of the report, the “find” may have been the result of residual 
radiation from a hot spot deposited as a result of the Simon or Harry Shots a few months earlier. 
By the late spring of 1954, Washington County was in the midst of a uranium boom, with 
reports of new veins and mining claims appearing almost weekly in the WCN from June through 
October.  That May, Lyman reported on the importance of uranium mining to Utah in general 
and at the nearby Mt. Trumbull area just across the border in Arizona.  She also remarked that 
“atomic energy commission geologists have been conducting tests on the properties for the past 
several weeks, and I predict that if this ‘find’ proves to be as rich as is estimated, roads will be 
built in a hurry.”428  A few weeks later, an article reported that two Washingtonians had 
announced “that they have the largest deposit of commercial uranium and copper ore ever 
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discovered in Washington county [sic].”429  After several more sites near St. George had “been 
reported excellent uranium finds,” Lyman reported a rumor she had heard that “the government 
is moving in on one of them for some exploratory work.”430  She also exclaimed that she “could 
get so excited and begin to do some prospecting myself if the Boss didn’t keep my nose to the 
grindstone all the time.”431  She had regained her composure by the following week and offered a 
caveat:   
Utah is going crazy over uranium.  Maybe that’s all right, but while the fever is on, there’s 
going to be thousands of people invest [sic] their small savings in pretty certificates which 
won’t be worth the match that will some day burn them....  I do not wish to discourage 
thoughtful, wise investment or exploration, for if nobody blazed a trail, our resources would 
never be developed.432 
 
Despite her admonishment for caution, the following page contained an article which reported 
that a local prospecting group had “sold a uranium showing mining claim on lower Kolob 
mountain for $9000 to a Salt Lake company,” which announced its intention “to start work and 
develop the claim right away.”433  In August, Lyman reported that violence had erupted between 
prospectors, and she “wonder[ed] when the big find will develop and the shooting start.”434  Still, 
she asserted her “hope [that] somebody strikes it soon with proof,” and stated that the local court 
house had more than 100 mining claims filed.435 
Despite the pandemonium surrounding uranium prospecting, it seems that none of St. 
George’s mining claims ever became large producers, though the speculation of striking upon a 
rich vein continued.  In October 1954, a WCN article reported that Searchlight Uranium 
Company had purchased a large plot of land near Silver Reef, and the AEC had recently “drilled 
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three test holes on the 32 claims and have tested the property with instruments and report finding 
uranium showings....  Indications are that the St. George area will shortly become an active 
producer of uranium ore.”436  The same publication contained an ad for a thirty-six page 
pamphlet, “Facts you should know about URANIUM,” which Uranium Publishers, Inc., was 
offering by mail order for one dollar.437  Two months later, in detailing a new uranium mine 
claim, Lyman professed “I sincerely hope that this discovery proves rich, indeed, and opens up 
employment for many who are not working in the mines at this time, as well as to remunerate 
well those who own the property.”438  The paper never reported a development to this end, 
however, and the following June the UMA ran an ad entitled “Uranium—Prosperity Producer,” 
which lauded Utah as the “country’s number one producer of uranium.”439  Having abandoned 
the “Miner Mike says...” feature and replacing it with the slogan “From the earth comes an 
abundant life for all,” the UMA claimed that uranium mining operations alone accounted for 
1,500 jobs statewide, and promised that “as production increases, Utahns can look forward to 
more jobs and greater prosperity from this youngest member of the mining family.”440 
The AEC announced prices and general requirements for uranium prospectors in 
November 1957.  These included “commercial-type contracts” and bonus payments for “the 
prospector and small miner during the early stages of development and mining.”441  The article 
claimed that these features had “sustained small marginal operations for considerable periods; 
and some of these have developed into profitable mines.”442  By April 1961, the UMA reported 
that whereas “total U.S. ore production was 54,000 tons” in 1948, Utah alone had “produced 
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1,071,000 tons, containing uranium oxide... valued at approximately $50,000,000” in 1960.443  
The ad further claimed that the industry was providing 1,550 jobs “in Utah, with an annual 
payroll of $10,000,000.  The uranium industry has come of age!”444  This is an interesting 
advertisement, since the UMA had featured an ad two years earlier which claimed “Uranium has 
been responsible for about 8000 jobs in Utah since 1950,” which presumably included the 
tertiary jobs sustained as a result of mining and milling enterprises.445  Still, the taxable property 
value of the industry for 1958 was around $29 million.446 
Washington County’s economy undoubtedly benefitted from the potential of a major 
uranium discovery in the area beyond the actual production of the mines.  Local hotels and 
motels, restaurants and other food providers, and various other commercial businesses would 
have experienced a rise in revenue as a result of prospectors and corporate agents visiting the 
region in search of profits.  The local population also would have been spending money in the 
search for uranium.  In addition to providing standard hardware supplies for mining operations, 
Nelson Supply Company in St. George regularly advertised Geiger counters from 1953 to 1955.  
The earliest example from July 1953 advertised the P. R. I. Geiger counter under the heading, 
“Want $10,000?”447  The ad promised a “super-sensitive” device which would render uranium 
“deposits... easily detected.  Flasher, meter, earphones indicate presence of radioactive material 
and estimate quality and quantity of ore right in the field....  Win fortune, fame and lifetime 
security!”448   
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In a similar ad in October 1954, the heading had been changed to “Discover URANIUM” 
and the promise of winning “fortune, fame and lifetime security” had been omitted.449  A “New, 
Improved Model” was featured in March 1955, claiming that it was “the uranium prospecting 
Instrument you’ve been asking for.”450  Apparently, local prospectors did not use the devices 
solely for prospecting, as the AEC reported in 1955 that since Geiger counters “register only as 
high as 20 milliroentgens per hour... [they] can go completely off-scale in fall-out which is far 
from hazardous.”451  The commission assured the downwinders that despite any strange readings 
they may receive from their devices, “if the fall-out is heavy enough to be of any significance, 
our monitors will be in the area and tell you what is happening.”452  There is no doubt that AEC 
officials utilized the frenzy of Washingtonians to find large uranium deposits using Geiger 
counters to dismiss instances of radioactive hot spots and allay public fears. 
Aside from AEC programs and the influx of prospectors, Washington County 
experienced economic benefits from other federal sources.  In 1951, a group from the University 
of Chicago’s Land-Use Planning committee spent six months in the county in order to collect 
information which they used “to describe and evaluate the impact of government programs on 
the agriculture and rural life of a relatively isolated western community where the pressure of 
population on food and other resources is fairly high.”453  By March, the four-member group was 
reportedly “enjoying the weather, the scenery, and the people thus far contacted.”454  That 
Washington officials and residents counted this group as part of the community is corroborated 
in the article, which reported that “this group of new Washington county [sic] citizens are 
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looking forward to a happy period of work here.”455  It seems that Washingtonians were quick to 
accept outsiders as members of the community, especially when they viewed the immigrants as 
productive members of society. 
Washington County’s most significant source of non-nuclear-related federal dollars came 
from the Hurricane Supersonic Research Site (HSRS).  The WCN reported in July 1954 that State 
Representative Owen Sanders of Hurricane had received a confirmation letter from Senator 
Wallace Bennett that the Air Force would construct a testing facility on Lower Smith Mesa 
between Hurricane and Virgin City, Utah.  Bennett’s letter indicated that “‘between 20 and 40 
men will be used in operation’” of a high-speed track to “test air force ejection equipment.”456  
The objective of the facility was to launch fighter jet ejection seats “at supersonic speeds along 
the track and then... hurtled into space from a 1500-foot mesa.”457  The facility, originally named 
Supersonic Military Air Research Track at Hurricane Mesa, was designed, constructed, and 
operated by Coleman Engineering Company, which had submitted the low bid of 
$1,023,616.50.458  Coleman Engineering completed the project and conducted the first 
experiment on July 8, 1955, and at the height of its use as many as five aerospace corporations 
were experimenting at the facility at the same time.459  From the first test through August 14, 
1958, companies had conducted more than 150 trials at HSRS while discovering ways in which 
to solve the problems associated with ejections from jet-propelled aircraft, which was “a vital 
part of the national defense program.”460   
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The HSRS was also a vital part of Washington County’s economy.  Coleman Engineering 
reported that, in 1960, it had “employed 67 persons full time, in addition to 3,939 man days 
which temporary employees, most of whom were local people, worked;” this resulted in 
“$400,000 in payroll checks annually.”461  Coleman also reported buying “more than $200,000 
worth of goods and services on the local market and paid $50,000 for its utilities.”462  
Additionally, an internal company estimate found that its staff “annually spent $90,000 for food, 
$50,000 for clothing and household necessities, $30,000 for utilities, $50,000 for car expenses, 
and additional amounts for medical care, entertainment, new cars, furniture, and other items.”463  
The facility did not last long, however, as the base had closed by December 1961, although there 
were efforts in 1963 to restore it.  Stanley Aviation Company took control of the facility in July 
1963 with intentions to “revive the rocket sled testing site employing between 12 and 100 
persons.”464  Representative Lloyd wrote to Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara in 
August 1963, supporting the Dixie Project “as an aid to our defense effort through improvement 
of the Hurricane Supersonic Test Track.”465  Lloyd also told McNamara that “I am anxious to 
have the project approved as a means of improving the economy of the area.”466 
In addition to the AEC’s uranium program and the HSRS project, the Civil Defense 
Administration and other military and AEC programs helped to account for Washington 
County’s share of over $100 billion Congress allocated for military projects in the western 
United States from 1946 to 1973.467  In 1953, the AEC established one of six new 
microbarographic research stations at St. George as part of a project “to study the effects of 
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meteorological conditions on blast phenomena to make possible the prediction of where the blast 
[from NTS shots] might strike and what its strength might be.”468  The USAF opened a Strategic 
Air Command Radar Bomb Scoring location in St. George in 1963.  Initial reports indicated 
“that military personnel of the unit would be made up of four commissioned officers together 
with 50 to 70 Air Force Technicians of varied uncommissioned [sic] military ranks [whose] 
families will add more than 100 children of school age to our community.”469  St. George’s 
Chamber of Commerce estimated “that the new payroll will add some $25,000 to $30,000 
monthly to the purchasing power of our community.”470  The Bomb Scoring group began 
“electronically tracking bombers” in October 1963.471  Major J. H. Zuidema issued a statement in 
which he claimed that “our 75 military people and their families will live in town; their children 
will attend the local schools, go to the local doctors and dentists and, in general, become an 
integral part of the community.”472  With these substantial economic factors weighed into the 
equation, it would have been extremely costly for Washingtonians to protest in large numbers 
against the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission at the Nevada Test Site. 
Nationally, there were blossoming peace and environmental movements which preached 
“there is not peace—real peace—while more than half of our federal budget goes in an armament 
race... and the earth’s atmosphere is contaminated from week to week by exploding hydrogen 
bombs.”473  However, Utahns in general, and Washingtonians specifically, clung to a divine 
mandate for human progress:  “Day by day since time began, God sees the steady gain of 
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man.”474  In an editorial column which frequently appeared in the WCN and featured various 
authors, George Peck outlined his criteria for “sound ethical religion,” among which was the 
necessity for humanity to acknowledge 
God as the supreme being, the author of life and creator of all things—of God to whom man 
is accountable for the constructive or destructive use of his life—of God with whom he 
finally hopes to be united in Eternity as a reward for making the proper use of his life—of 
God from whom he may be forever separated as punishment for failure to properly exploit 
his opportunities.475 
 
For Washingtonians, economic prosperity followed from adherence to the divine plan for human 
progress.  It would be unthinkable for these people to question the scientific progress the AEC 
was achieving at NTS publicly, and it would be questioning God’s providence to refuse the 
economic benefits that progress rendered. 
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LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF THE BOMBS 
 
“The greatest irony of our atmospheric nuclear testing program is that the only victims of the 
United States nuclear arms since World War II have been our own people.”476 
 
Following Japan’s capitulation in August 1945 to end World War II, the U. S. 
government began gathering data and analyzing the effects of radiation released by atomic 
weapons.  Eventually establishing the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, the federal 
government continued to study chemical and biological changes in the natural environment’s 
flora and fauna while it conceived and developed more powerful weapons and stockpiled a large 
nuclear arsenal.  After testing began at the Nevada Test Site in 1951, residents of Washington 
County largely remained patriotic in their support of the government’s national security 
programs.  However, a series of mishaps and the public’s perception of strange weather patterns 
led these people to question the impact of the experiments on their local environment.  The 
AEC’s public relations specialists and Utah’s federal and state politicians worked feverishly to 
quell Washingtonians’ fears, and the economic impact of primary and secondary industries 
helped to alleviate any residual complaints of the citizenry. 
The U. S., U. K., and U. S. S. R., signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, at Moscow on August 5, 1963, thus effectively 
ending atmospheric experiments by countries which possessed nuclear weapons technology.  The 
treaty proclaimed the existence of a mutual understanding among the powers to work toward 
“the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.”477  This did not 
completely eliminate the practice of experimenting with weapons, however.  The signatories 
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simply moved further experiments underground until 1992, when the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty forced all future tests in the U. S. to be conducted by computer simulations.478 
The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) replaced the AEC in 
1975, and produced a report in 1977 on the environmental impact of nuclear weapons tests at 
NTS.  At the beginning of this report, the ERDA vowed that operations at NTS would “continue 
to include a variety of both nuclear and nonnuclear projects and experiments… [that] take 
advantage of the facilities available, the climate, the remoteness, and the controlled access.”479  
The administration believed that “the probable impact on the environment” from underground 
nuclear tests would be “small in comparison” to atmospheric detonations.480  Subterranean tests 
created radioactive cavities underground, but officials anticipated that all radioactivity would be 
contained underground.  The report claimed that “since 1971, the nuclear testing program has 
maintained a satisfactory degree of competency and consistency for containing radioactivity 
underground both during and following the nuclear detonations.”481  It then listed the last two 
cases when leaks were detected, both of which preceded the report by seven years or less.482  
This seemed to be an admission that, if the program was indeed consistent, there would be future 
leaks. 
More than 100,000 civilians resided in areas which fallout clouds from NTS traversed, 
and the tests (including those conducted at the Pacific Proving Ground) also contaminated 
around 205,000 military personnel.483  A 1997 investigation conducted by the National Cancer 
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Institute reiterated that a danger of contracting thyroid cancer existed as a result of exposure to 
radioactive fallout from atmospheric detonations of nuclear weapons.484  The remaining 
survivors and many of their families, friends, and community members affected by the 
experiments at NTS have joined to become a voice of opposition to nuclear experiments and 
enterprises in the American West.   
On March 30, 2006, the Pentagon issued a press release that announced plans for 
Operation DIVINE STRAKE, which was to be conducted at the Nevada Test Site in June of that 
year.  The operation derived its name from “divine”—in this sense meaning “altogether excellent 
or admirable; godlike”—and “strake,” which is “planking along the side of a boat…for 
controlling” the flow of water around the vessel.  The stated intention of the operation was to 
further the development of “so-called bunker-buster weapons” in order to allow for greater 
accuracy in forecasting the effectiveness of such weapons “against granite, hard structures.”485  
The experiment was to consist of one, non-nuclear, 700-ton, fuel oil and ammonium nitrate 
bomb.486  The spokesperson’s comment that “‘it is the first time in Nevada that you’ll see a 
mushroom cloud…since we [the Department of Energy] stopped testing [atmospheric] nuclear 
weapons” in 1963, exacerbated concerns that the explosion would create a mushroom cloud 
extending 10,000 feet above the earth’s surface.  The public outcry was enormous, with large 
public gatherings in cities and towns in Nevada, Utah, and Idaho to protest the proposed test.   
Why would the testing of a non-nuclear weapon on lands designated as a military 
installation invoke such ire in the surrounding population?  The residents’ prior experience with 
the government’s nuclear weapons establishment is the only explanation.  These people were 
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well aware that experiments conducted within the borders of Western military installations did 
not always produce results which remained within those borders.  Furthermore, information 
included in a flyer distributed by protest activists claimed that DIVINE STRAKE was only the 
beginning of a larger DOE effort to overhaul the U. S. nuclear weapons complex.  Representative 
James David Matheson (2nd District, Utah), in an April 2006 letter to Dr. James A. Tegnelia, the 
director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), stated: 
You are well aware that at 700 tons… this demonstration will not simulate an actual 
conventional bomb because no bomber in the U. S. fleet has the capacity to carry a 
weapon of this size.  Based on publicly available unclassified information, the 0.6 kt 
simulation is much smaller than any nuclear weapon the U. S. currently possesses.  
Therefore, in spite of your public assurances… that this test is not part of plans to 
develop a new nuclear weapon, I remain greatly concerned that DTRA is in fact working 
to assist in the development of a low-yield nuclear weapon.487 
 
If this had been the case, it would have violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 
which the U. S. helped to formulate, as the treaty called for “the cessation of the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national 
arsenals of nuclear weapons.”488 
According to Deseret Morning News, “two Utah anti-nuclear activists… [and] members 
of the Winnemucca Indian Colony” had filed a lawsuit at the U. S. District Court in Nevada by 
mid-April to prevent the execution of the operation.  The plaintiffs claimed that the detonation 
would “create a 10,000-foot mushroom cloud” that would disperse the radioactive nuclides from 
the ground at NTS into the atmosphere and create another health hazard for communities 
downwind from the test site.489  While some politicians, such as Utah’s Governor Jon Meade 
                                                 
487
 Jim Matheson, Letter to the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, April 7, 2006, 
http://www.house.gov/matheson/pdf/DTRA_Divine_Strake_ letter.pdf (accessed March 11, 2007). 
488
 U.S. Department of State,  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, (1968), as amended, December 1998,  
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr/0980/ml022200111-vol2.pdf (accessed March 13, 
2007).  
489
 Deseret Morning News, “Activists and Tribe Sue to Avert Blast,” April 23, 2006. 
 128 
Huntsman, Jr., and Representative Matheson, requested the operation be aborted outright, others 
simply asked the DOE to provide the citizens of Utah public forums at which they could voice 
their concerns.490  The government disputed the claims of the critics, and claimed that “the 
explosion will not harm humans or the environment.”491  However, the DTRA announced on 
May 26 that it would indefinitely suspend the commencement of the test “until questions about 
its safety are answered.”492  At the beginning of August, DTRA Director Tegnelia told Utah 
Senator Orrin Grant Hatch that “the agency may opt to move the experiment somewhere else.”493  
Hatch remarked that he felt Tegnelia “‘now clearly understands the unique sensitivities that the 
people of Utah have regarding this subject,’” but the DTRA was awaiting a new Environmental 
Impact Statement.494  It remained unclear whether Tegnelia was concerned about people from 
other states. 
On December 22, 2006, the DTRA released its environmental assessment.  The authors 
of the report stated that it “was conducted to support [my emphasis] assessment of potential 
impacts.”495  Perhaps this is over-scrutinizing semantics, but the wording is such as to give the 
impression that the report was biased from the beginning.  The report continued, stating that 
DTRA “targeted radionuclides present at the site without regard to source (natural or man-made, 
local or distant sources)….  The results from these samples confirmed that” the soils “potentially 
affected by the experiment did not contain areas of radioactivity that are” above normal 
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background levels.496  Speaking to the Deseret Morning News on December 23, Robert R. 
Hager, a “lawyer  representing an Indian tribe and people living downwind” with Hager & Hearn 
Law Office in Reno, Nevada, said that the government had admitted and “‘issued an apology [in 
1990] to downwinder Americans for causing tens of thousands of cancers with the same material 
that’s in the soil at the test site….  The downwinders I represent are terrified at the prospect of 
history repeating itself….  Yet this government seems committed to this very thing.’”497 
The governor’s office held two public hearings in Utah in January 2007, the first of 
which occurred in St. George.  At that meeting, the mayor of Sprindale declared that if the 
experiment held the potential to “affect even one person in the public, this test should be 
halted.”498  Paralee Eckman named her two sisters as cancer victims, as well as other friends and 
acquaintances from Washington County who she knew personally to have contracted cancer in 
the years following the atmospheric testing period.499  Retired physicist and Ivins resident 
Raymond Cyr noted that government officials had revised their initial assessment that the 
experiment would not disperse radioactive materials to admitting that, in fact, some material 
would be dispersed and could potentially make its way downwind.500  Claudia Peterson, 
employed at the Dixie Regional Medical Center, asserted that she lost her father, sister, daughter, 
father-in-law, and mother-in-law to various cancers, and had several nieces and nephews who 
were battling cancer.501  Many more wrenching personal accounts of loss suffered as a result of 
NTS atmospheric tests followed, as well as understandable incredulousness at the assertions of 
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the environmental assessment which claimed that there would be limited or no impact on 
surrounding areas. 
The DTRA officially announced the permanent cancellation of Operation DIVINE 
STRAKE in March 2007, so history will have to wait to repeat itself.  The agency finally caved 
to public protest over the resumption of large detonations at NTS.  There were many different 
people protesting for very different reasons, including land disputes, health concerns, and the 
fear of advancing nuclear weapons research.  The complexity of the world situation prior to and 
during World War II created a complex set of circumstances in which the United States was 
forced to bring to bear all its available resources.  These complexities, in turn, led to the 
development of the nuclear military-industrial complex in the deserts of the American West, and 
thus the necessity (or, temptation) to conduct experiments of capability.  It is true that the tests 
harmed thousands of innocent people who are still living (or grieving) the effects of these tests.  
At the time, however, they were considered to be necessary to national security.  The federal 
government still controls many “barren” lands in the western American deserts, although the 
legality of this situation has been in question for many years.  But, while this persists, and as 
long as interests of national security are being threatened by “enemies of democracy,” we have 
no guarantee that the national security interests will not outweigh the supremely delicate nature 
with which nuclear matters should be handled, no guarantee that a complex history will not 
repeat itself. 
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